


THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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# Bulletin



Vol. XXXVI, No. 938

June 17, 1957

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SPECIAL

WEEKLY RECORD

UNITED STATES

FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

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June 17, 1957

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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June 17

## Visit of Chancellor Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany

*Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, made an official visit to Washington from May 24 to 29. Following are the texts of a communique and joint declaration issued by the Chancellor and President Eisenhower at the conclusion of their talks, addresses made by Dr. Adenauer before the Congress, and a statement made by Acting Secretary Herter at the time of the Chancellor's departure, together with an announcement of the members of the official party.*

### COMMUNIQUE AND JOINT DECLARATION

White House press release dated May 28

MAY 28, 1957.

#### COMMUNIQUE

The President of the United States and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany concluded today the cordial discussions they have conducted during the last several days, with the assistance of the Secretary of State and the German Foreign Minister, and other advisers.

These discussions permitted a comprehensive exchange of views concerning German-United States relations, the European situation, and the world situation. They have served to strengthen still further the close understanding and harmony of views already existing between the two governments.

As a result of their talks, the President and the Chancellor have issued a Joint Declaration regarding matters of mutual interest.

#### JOINT DECLARATION

##### I.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that the basic aim of the policies of their two countries

is the maintenance of peace in freedom. To that end it is the common policy of their governments to work for the achievement of conditions in which all nations can live in peace and freedom and devote their energies and resources to promoting the welfare of their peoples.

They agreed that the realization of these conditions depends upon the removal of the causes of tension existing between the Soviet Union and the Free World. This tension is mainly attributable to the acts and policies of the Soviet Union, among them the deprivation of other peoples of their freedom.

The President and the Chancellor noted with great concern the consequences of the brutal Soviet intervention in Hungary. The continued suppression of the rights of the Hungarian people makes it difficult for other nations to accept as genuine the professed Soviet desires for peaceful coexistence.

The President and the Chancellor reaffirmed that the ending of the unnatural and unjust division of Germany is a major objective of the foreign policies of the two governments. Germany must be reunited on a free and democratic basis by peaceful means. If the Soviet rulers really desire peace and the relaxation of international tension, they can give no better proof than to permit the reunification of Germany through free elections.

The President and the Chancellor emphasized that the restoration of German national unity need give rise to no apprehension on the part of the Soviet Union as to its own security. It is not the purpose of their governments to gain any one-sided military advantage from the reunification of Germany. In conjunction with such reunification, they stand ready, as stated at the two Geneva conferences of 1955, to enter into European security arrangements which would provide far-reaching assurances to the Soviet Union.

June 17, 1957

## II.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that NATO is essential for the protection of the security of the entire free world. They agreed that the defensive strength of NATO must be further improved in the face of the continuing Soviet threat and the absence of a dependable agreement for major reductions of armaments. The German Federal Government will proceed as rapidly as possible with building up its agreed contribution to the Western collective defense system.

For the purpose of contributing its fair share to the defense of the North Atlantic area, the United States intends to maintain forces in Europe, including Germany, as long as the threat to the area exists. As the North Atlantic Council agreed at its recent meeting at Bonn, the Atlantic Alliance must be in a position to use all available means to meet any attack which might be launched against it. The availability of the most modern weapons of defense will serve to discourage any attempt to launch such an attack.

## III.

The President and the Chancellor expressed gratification over the significant progress made over the last several months toward closer economic integration in Europe. The Chancellor expressed his belief that the treaties establishing EURATOM and the European Common Market, signed at Rome on March 25 of this year, constitute a further step of historic significance toward European unity. The President expressed the great interest of the United States Government and of the American people in these treaties and his belief that their entry into force will benefit not only the people of Europe, but those of the entire world.

## IV.

The two governments are in agreement that efforts must be pressed in the United Nations to reach agreement on measures for disarmament, with respect to both conventional and nuclear weapons, under an effective system of international control.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that, if a beginning could be made toward effective measures of disarmament, this would create a degree of confidence which would facilitate further progress in the field of disarmament and in

the settlement of outstanding major political problems, such as the reunification of Germany.

They agreed that if such initial steps succeed they should be followed within a reasonable time by a comprehensive disarmament agreement which must necessarily presuppose a prior solution of the problem of German reunification. Accordingly, the Chancellor advised the President, as he has the French and British Governments, that the Federal Republic would consider that the conclusion of an initial disarmament agreement might be an appropriate time for a conference on the reunification of Germany among the Foreign Ministers of the four powers responsible therefor. The United States will consult with the French and British Governments regarding this matter.

The President stressed that any measures for disarmament applicable to Europe would be accepted by the United States only with the approval of the NATO allies, which he hoped would take a leading role in this regard, and taking into account the link between European security and German reunification. He assured the Chancellor that the United States does not intend to take any action in the field of disarmament which would prejudice the reunification of Germany. He stated that the United States would consult with the German Federal Government closely on all matters affecting Germany arising in the disarmament negotiations.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

28 May 1957.

## ADDRESS TO HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 28

MR. SPEAKER, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: I am deeply conscious of the honor of speaking before you, the elected representatives of the strongest and freest nation on earth; and with all my heart I thank you for this distinction. I know that I do not stand here for myself alone, but for all my countrymen. What I am going to say, therefore, is meant as a message from them to the great American people.

The Federal Republic of Germany is young—not quite 8 years old. It is still incomplete and will remain incomplete as long as reunion with the 17 million Germans living in the Soviet-occupied zone has not been effected. We have been



sovereign for 3 years; only since then have we been the masters of our political decisions.

When totalitarian national socialism collapsed, after having inflicted unspeakable suffering on the world and the German people, it left chaos behind. There were millions of dead and crippled, 10 million people who were expelled from their ancestral homes in the German East, burned cities, industries and lines of transportation destroyed, the economy ruined, an administration functioning on an emergency basis only, desperate human beings, and, above all, a younger generation dangerously exposed to pernicious nihilism.

The German people went to work, supported in their first steps by the Western occupation powers, who gradually became our allies and friends. They reconstructed their homes, factories, stores, highways, and railroads. The German people worked hard and with self-discipline. They received invaluable help from outside sources, both public and private, and especially from the American people. The great work of the Marshall plan, undertaken 10 years ago, will never be forgotten by Europeans. It is my heartfelt desire at this hour to express our gratitude for all of this.

Consciously and deliberately, rejecting all totalitarian thoughts and aims, we began to erect our Federal Republic in that part of Germany in which freedom and human rights could be reestablished; we created this Republic on the unshakable foundation of democracy—with the inspired words of Abraham Lincoln in mind—"government of the people, by the people, for the people." Freedom, respect for the inalienable rights of the individual, and the principle of the rule of law—this is the credo of our constitution. In this respect we could revert to the best traditions of our people. Our economy was organized on the principle of competitive free enterprise and social justice. We call this economic system the social market economy, and it combines free enterprise with social responsibility. The economic consequences of war destruction we endeavored to distribute equitably on many shoulders, in our thoroughgoing equalization-of-burdens law.

The greatest problems, however, were posed for us by the world around us, that is, the international situation. The world of which our new

Federal Republic had to become a part was divided into two camps. The situation confronted our people with the most important decision it has ever had to make. Without hesitation we decided—and this is the meaning of the first parliamentary elections in 1949—for freedom against slavery, for the dignity of the individual against the collective mind, for rule by law against arbitrary dictatorship. Since 1953 there has not been a single Communist in our freely elected parliament.

In repeated decisions of their own choice the people of the Federal Republic by a large majority have confirmed that our nation constitutes an inseparable part of the free world. The basic expression of this attitude is our allegiance to the unity of Europe. Therefore we became a member of the Strasbourg Council of Europe and the OEEC. We participated in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, in the attempt to create a European defense community and a European political community, and we hope that the common market and EURATOM will soon be ratified by the parliaments of all six countries concerned. We have participated in all these works, knowing that they mean an indissoluble bond to the world of freedom.

As early as 1948, when our constitution was drafted by the Constituent Assembly—the Parliamentary Council under my presidency—we made a provision whereby parts of our sovereignty could be transferred by a simple law to a European community. This was a renunciation of the concept that national sovereignty is still a principle suitable to the establishment of a political order in Europe. This principle has cost Europe dearly in the many wars of the past.

With the free world we share the dangers which threaten it, dangers to peace. As a country whose very arteries are now cut—by the Iron Curtain—we are vividly aware of these dangers. Therefore we need safeguards. We find these safeguards within the powerful North Atlantic alliance, whose main support is the moral, political, economic, and military strength of the United States. NATO, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations, is an instrument for the preservation of freedom. The Western World created it after the Soviets almost completely paralyzed the security mechanism of the United Nations which had been devised with so much care and idealism.

In our strenuous efforts to make our contribution to the military strength of the alliance, we, too, have nothing else in mind but the defense of our liberty. On my word before God, nobody in Germany plays with the idea of using force or war, and this includes the use of force in the question of German reunification, which we desire so ardently. Still fresh in our memory is the horror of the nights of bombing during the Second World War and the terrible devastation of our country.

That is why in our sincere love for peace we follow with such acute attention and sympathy the efforts of your Government by an overall controlled disarmament to diminish the danger of war. These efforts, coupled with elimination of the causes of tension in the world—characterized, most of all, in defiance of reason, justice, and morality, by the division of my country and its courageous capital, Berlin—must in the end give to mankind the security for which it longs and to which it is entitled in order to live according to its true destiny, to the highest principles of humanity. Without real effort, however, and without the sincere cooperation of the free peoples we know that this objective will never be attained.

These are only the most essential facts and motives that may help you to understand us—that is, what we are and how we act. Let me attempt to sum up with a statement that gives me much pleasure:

The understanding and agreement—I daresay the cordial friendship—that exists today between the American and the German people is not the product of an accidental coincidence of transient interests. It rests on the common ground of profound convictions. It rests on the only power that moves free human beings to unite their destinies lastingly—it rests on confidence. The German people trust in you. Preserve your trust in them. This I ask of you.

#### ADDRESS TO SENATE, MAY 28

Translation

MR. PRESIDENT, MEMBERS OF THE SENATE: I am very grateful for the opportunity you have accorded me to speak before you. This opportunity is an honor for me and my country. I wish to use it to outline in a few words the general direction of our foreign policy.

I hope, in this way, to contribute to a clear understanding which is the basis of genuine trust. At the same time I hope to make clear how deeply related are the basic principles characterizing American policy and German policy.

The first principle, the guiding motive, of our policy is freedom. There may be differences of opinion on the methods by which freedom may best be assured and preserved. Although the Government led by me may consider dangerous some of the foreign policy solutions advocated by other political parties and groups, there is no difference of opinion among Germans in the sincere desire for freedom. Since the Bundestag elections of 1949, it has been clearly demonstrated where the Federal Republic of Germany stands in the great worldwide conflict between freedom and slavery. This is the deeper meaning of the decision taken at the polls by the German people in 1949.

When the German people regained their statehood and once more were able to exercise their own free will, the world was split into two camps and the border separating the free world from the Communist orbit ran through the heart of our country, dividing our people. It separated ancient German territory from us, land from which currents of creative spiritual life have enriched our Western civilization. The German people did not hesitate to make an unequivocal decision. Since the elections of 1953 there has not been a single Communist in our freely elected parliament. Two grievous experiences influenced the choice of the German people: the experience with a totalitarian dictatorship imposed on us during the National Socialist regime and the daily contact with the reality of communism in the form of a Communist dictatorship in the Soviet zone of Germany. But the German people have expressed their will for freedom not only by the rejection of totalitarianism but by the positive decision to form as close an alliance as possible with the other free peoples of the world. There is no more emphatic manifestation of this will than the policy of European integration consistently endorsed by the great majority of the German people and their elected representatives—a policy which the Federal Republic has pursued since its inception.

The Federal Republic has participated in all the European organizations set up in recent years:

the Council of Europe, OEEC, and the Coal and Steel Community. These integrated communities, the Coal and Steel Community and the communities of the common market and of EURATOM, which we hope will soon come to life, are particularly characteristic because in these organs the Federal Republic renounces part of its national sovereignty in the interest of larger European communities. It reflects great credit on the foresighted ones among the drafters of our constitution that we can state today that our basic law already contained a provision permitting the transfer of sovereignty by simple majority vote in Parliament. That was a great decision. It meant no less than a repudiation of the idea, no longer valid in a disintegrating world of European politics, that the sovereign national state is the ultimate and highest entity of political organization—an idea which has cost Europe so much blood and treasure. We are glad that the idea of a larger European patriotism has formed roots, particularly among our young people. Through the medium of these European organizations our alliance with the free world has become truly unbreakable.

Our second goal is peace. The horrible experiences of the recent World War have left their marks on the German people. The millions of dead, the horrors of total war in which the hinterland is no longer left untouched, the terrible destruction of our cities, the ruin of our economy, the collapse of the administrative structure—all this is still alive in the minds of the German people. But since peace—according to the famous dictum of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant—is not a natural condition among the peoples but the result of a conscious effort of man, our policy has seized on all possibilities open to it to secure peace. With the creation of the United Nations mankind took a tremendous stride forward toward securing peace and justice in the world. This objective has not been attained as yet, because the Soviets have paralyzed the security mechanism of the United Nations by innumerable vetoes. As a result, an effort had to be made to bring about this security by the establishment of organizations parallel and supplementing the United Nations. The charter of the United Nations, in wise foresight, has shown a path toward this end by confirming the right of individual and collective self-defense. This path

logically led to the foundation of the Atlantic community. The Atlantic community is an instrument of peace because it is designed to deter any aggressor. It achieves this aim by coordinating and developing the armed strength of the free West in such a way that any aggression becomes too big a risk for the aggressor. This consideration has caused the Federal Republic to become a member of the Atlantic community. Militaristic tendencies are far removed from our purpose and aggressive intentions even more so! Since we consider all our endeavors in the military sphere solely as defense efforts, we follow all the discussions on measures to bring about controlled disarmament with lively and positive interest. If these efforts are combined with elimination of the causes of tension in the world, they must, in the end, bring to the world the blessing it so ardently desires: the safeguarding of peace.

The third basic principle of our policy is unity. You know of the heavy and oppressive burden weighing upon us because many millions of Germans are forced, against all justice and moral principles, to live separated from us and under Communist terror. In order to understand this fully, one must realize that what is at stake here is not merely a border problem which can be discussed and settled among neighbors. We are faced here primarily with a human problem—the arbitrary manner in which a people is torn apart—parents separated from their children, unable to see them except under extreme difficulty and danger. Millions of people are forced to live under a regime of lawlessness, arbitrary rule, and slavery.

The German Republic will be incomplete as long as it is confined to the territory of the Federal Republic. Let us recall the circumstances under which the Federal Republic was founded. After the moral and material collapse into which the National Socialist regime led us, the victorious nations assumed supreme power in Germany. The three Western occupation powers, faithful to the responsibility which they shouldered at the same time and to their principles which were also the principles of the United Nations, proceeded to rebuild a German state on a democratic basis. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, misused its trusteeship and subjugated the Soviet-occupied zone to a subservient, satellite regime of Communists—a regime which had the backing of only

an infinitesimal percentage of the population as was demonstrated during the popular uprising of June 17, 1953. Thus it happened that the Soviet zone did not participate in the development which gradually transformed Germany from an object of foreign rule into a responsible subject in the community of nations governing itself in accordance with democratic principles.

Therefore, we demand reunion with 17 million fellow Germans—people who are as German as we are and as freedom-loving as we are, and who are no less entitled than we are to determine their own political destiny; we demand from the fourth of the victorious powers only that which the other three, in loyal fulfillment of the responsibility assumed by them when the German state collapsed, have long since conceded of their own free will. Thus, our demand is basically a democratic one, for the essence of democracy is to grant to a people regarding themselves as an entity that form of government which will permit them to live as a responsible member of the international community; and it is at the same time a requirement of any general policy aiming at the preservation of peace, for only the establishment of an all-German government would permit the conclusion of a peace treaty. This would endow Europe with that just and enduring political order which today—12 years after the war—is still denied to it.

Political action is the art of bringing to life those concepts which have been recognized as the ethical foundation of justice. Freedom, peace, unity—these are the aims of our policy, a policy designed to give effect to the great ideals that determine the progress of humanity.

#### STATEMENT BY ACTING SECRETARY HERTER

Press release 325 dated May 29

**MR. CHANCELLOR:** It is my honor to bid you farewell on behalf of President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and the American people.

Your visit here has been of great significance. The results are reflected, I believe, in the comprehensive joint declaration issued yesterday from the White House by you and President Eisenhower. This important document demonstrates

the broad area of agreement which exists between our two countries with regard to the policies we will follow in promoting our basic objective of freedom and peace for all mankind.

Along with the opportunity which your visit has afforded for a thorough discussion of the great problems confronting the free world, we have had the satisfaction of our cordial personal contacts with you and the other members of your party. I think that the real substance of the close understanding between the leaders and peoples of our two countries finds its best reflection in the personal trust and understanding that have characterized our relationship with each other. In this sense all of us who have had any part in the events and activities of your visit can feel rewarded.

And now, Mr. Chancellor, permit me to wish you a safe and speedy journey and to ask you to convey to the German people upon your return home the best wishes of the people of this country.

#### MEMBERS OF OFFICIAL PARTY

The Department of State announced on May 24 (press release 314) the members of the official party for the visit of Chancellor Adenauer to Washington, May 24–29. They are as follows:

Dr. Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany  
Heinrich von Brentano, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany  
Heinz L. Krekler, German Ambassador  
Wilhelm Grewe, Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs, Foreign Office  
Felix von Eckardt, Director, Federal Press Office  
Mrs. Libeth Werhahn, daughter of the Chancellor  
Georg Adenauer, son of the Chancellor  
Count Georg von Baudissin, Officer in Charge, NATO and Disarmament Affairs, Foreign Office  
Josef Selbach, Personal Aide to the Chancellor  
Georg von Lillienfeld, American Desk Officer, Foreign Office  
Peter Limbourg, Executive Assistant to the Foreign Minister  
Swidbert Schnippenkoetter, Executive Assistant, Foreign Office  
Karl-Guenther von Hase, Officer in Charge, Press Relations, Foreign Office  
Comdr. Bernd Klug, Defense Ministry



## Secretary Dulles' News Conference of May 29

Press release 323 dated May 29

*Secretary Dulles:* I have just learned that the White House has announced the prospective resignation of Secretary Humphrey as Secretary of the Treasury. I want to express my deep regret that he has felt it necessary to return to private life. We have had, I think—at least from my standpoint—a very ideal Cabinet relationship. He has worked vigorously, ably, and intelligently for what he regarded as sound fiscal policies; I have tried to work with equal ability for what I regard as sound foreign policies. Occasionally, although only rarely, our ideas did not readily coincide. But when we got together and talked things over, we always found a solution which was, I think, compatible both with sound foreign policy and with sound fiscal policy. And I think never in the period of more than 4 years that we have served together have we ever had a difference which we had to bring to the President to resolve between us. We always settled our differences face to face. And out of that has grown a very deep friendship and respect, which will continue on even though he no longer serves in the Cabinet.

Now for your questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, it seems like an appropriate time to ask you a question which comes up from time to time at these conferences. What are your own personal plans for the future?*

A. My personal plans for the future are to serve as Secretary of State. (Laughter)

*Q. For the remainder of this administration, Mr. Secretary?*

A. Well, I am not making plans that run ahead as much as nearly 4 years. That's quite a long time for anybody to plan. And I hope you will not draw any inferences from that, one way or another, because none are intended.

### London Disarmament Talks

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to come to a question of the substance of policy, as I guess that is the way you would put it, you are familiar now with Chancellor Adenauer's views on disarmament negotiation. The Chancellor said in a news conference yesterday that he thought German territory should not become involved in a first-stage disarmament agreement. Is it your understanding that any first-stage disarmament agreement which we might propose in the London talks would have no bearing on German territory?*

A. They would have no bearing on German territory except to the extent and to the degree that the Federal Republic wanted them to have a bearing on German territory.

You may recall that at my last press conference<sup>1</sup>—I think 2 weeks ago—I spoke of the fact that the extension of the first stage to Europe would, I thought, involve very considerable political difficulties. And I think that what Chancellor Adenauer has said confirms the thought that I then expressed. I believe that in this disarmament task the important thing is to get going somewhere, somehow, just as rapidly as possible, and that unless we do that it will be very difficult to stem the tide of ever-mounting military armaments and to check the armament race. The important thing is to get started in another direction. And I think myself that the scope of the initial start is less important than the fact of making some initial start and that, therefore, we should try to start where there are the minimum of political complications.

Now Governor Stassen has a very considerable degree of flexibility in that respect, and whether or not the initial start includes Western Europe will

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of June 3, 1957, p. 894.



primarily depend upon the Western European countries themselves. You have already heard the views of the Chancellor in that respect. No doubt other Western European countries will have their views. It is not the desire or intention of the United States to try to impose its views upon the Western European countries.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, prior to the Chancellor's public remarks yesterday was it your understanding from your private talks with him that his view was as firmly negative as it appeared to be in public on the inclusion of Germany in any first-step aerial inspection scheme? You said before that you had not excluded it, although you did say it would be more difficult. He appeared to exclude it absolutely in any first step.*

A. Well, I would not want to attempt to qualify or weaken in any way anything the Chancellor said for himself. He speaks clearly, authoritatively, and anything that we said in private I think ought not to be drawn out in any effort to derogate in any way from what he said himself publicly on this subject.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what position did you and the President take in relation to Big Four talks while you were talking with Adenauer? The communique<sup>2</sup> only said, I believe, that the United States would talk with Britain and France about it.*

A. We said that we would do so, and I believe that the Federal Republic itself has also approached the Governments of the United Kingdom and of France. I think it should be clearly borne in mind that the talk which the Chancellor suggests between the four powers is not anything that is just around the corner. It is a talk which he contemplates should take place upon the conclusion of the first phase of disarmament talks, and the conclusion of those will at best, I think, be a somewhat protracted effort. And, therefore, we are not, I think, thinking about anything that may happen within the next few weeks or even the next few months.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your understanding that Governor Stassen's instructions are to negotiate—to attempt to negotiate—a first-step agreement with the five powers on the London subcommittee, or even a larger group; or strictly a bilateral ar-*

*range ment between the United States and the Soviet Union?*

A. It would not, as I now see it, be a bilateral arrangement with the Soviet Union. I think it would be difficult to devise any significant first step which was merely a bilateral arrangement. Even if you take, for example, what I gave for illustrative purposes, the Arctic area; that, of course, involves Canada to a very considerable extent, it might involve Denmark to a very considerable extent in relation to Greenland; so that a disarmament agreement could not even to that extent be bilateral. Also, aspects of it which relate to nuclear weapons production would almost surely involve other states. Therefore, it could not effectively, I think, be a purely bilateral arrangement.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did Chancellor Adenauer bring up at all the question of German property which has been seized by the United States Government in the World War?*

A. Yes, he mentioned that. I think he reported that at his press conference yesterday.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on this disarmament, I wonder if I could ask you a question as to whether or not the Chancellor's views changed the American position at all in the London talks?*

A. Well, it is difficult to say that one's point of view is not always to some extent changed by an exchange of views with other people, particularly a person of as positive views and of as respected views as the Chancellor. I would say that insofar as the instructions given to Governor Stassen, as our representative there, are concerned, the exchange of views which we had did not involve any alteration of the guiding instructions given to Governor Stassen.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that the injection of the German question into the disarmament talks at this stage might not prejudice the progress of the first-phase negotiations?*

A. Well, I don't quite get the point of that. I think that it can be said, and I think that it would be plausibly said, that to make the reunification of Germany a condition precedent to any steps in disarmament would certainly prejudice any early completion of the first stage.

*Q. Isn't that what we have done in a sense?*

<sup>2</sup> See p. 955.

A. Chancellor Adenauer has said that he does not think that the first stage should deal with matters which might have an impact upon the reunification of Germany; therefore, I think it means that this very complicated and difficult problem of the reunification of Germany would not perhaps, according to his views at least, be included in the first stage.

#### Riots on Formosa

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect that the riots on Formosa will lead to any change of policy by the United States in dealing with the question of the Nationalist Government, or on a broader level would it affect our policies in the Far East generally?*

A. I do not think it will involve any change of our basic policies in the Far East or our policies toward the Nationalist Government. It would perhaps accelerate the kind of studies which were already under way as to how to minimize somewhat the inevitable tensions which arise when large numbers of forces—troops particularly of a foreign country—are quartered on foreign soil. That is a very delicate and explosive issue, and it has been under study for some little time to see whether those risks could be mitigated. I think that aspect of the matter will involve some changes. I hope it will. But as far as the political policies are concerned, I do not anticipate any change.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have you made a judgment that the presence of large numbers of American troops on Formosa was the underlying cause for the rioting?*

A. Well, we had not yet made any final conclusion because the evidence is not all in. But insofar as there is available evidence, it would seem to me to indicate that that is the basic cause of the trouble.

*Q. I wanted to ask a question on the problem of troops in other countries. We have a tense situation in Japan over the Girard case which involved a court-martial proceeding or an argument over which country would try the sergeant. Could you give us your thinking on the Girard case as it affects Japanese relations?*

A. Well, there would be a definite conclusion on that matter probably in the early future. But

at the present time I would merely say that that matter is being studied very carefully at a high level. Of course, the issue involved in that particular case is not merely the question as to whether under the status-of-forces agreement Japan or the United States should exercise jurisdiction. That matter was gone into very thoroughly, and a decision was reached last March by the representatives of the United States to waive jurisdiction in that particular case.

Now, this waiver practice is one that has been very widely followed. I think that within the last 3-year period of which I have the figures in mind there were approximately 12,500 cases. The Japanese waived jurisdiction in over 12,000 of them. The waiver procedure is quite general where there is perhaps concurrent jurisdiction, and that procedure was followed in this particular case by a waiver by the United States. So the case had gone somewhat beyond the preliminary stages.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the Formosa rioting there have been reports that the Chinese Nationalist Government had actually encouraged publicity in connection with its protest against the acquittal of the GI in the independent reports from Taiwan. Have you any evidence of the Chinese Government in any way contributing to the stirring up of the emotions?*

A. No, we have no evidence to indicate they contributed toward it. Perhaps they were not as vigilant as they might have been to try to take measures to keep the situation under control. They may have miscalculated the explosive character of the situation and of the crowds who gathered in front of the various United States buildings.

You know this question of foreign troops is a very, very difficult question. If I can just take a minute, I might tell you a little episode which is deeply engraved in my mind. It was in Paris, in the winter of 1918-19. I was there with the U.S. delegation at the Peace Conference. We were in the Hotel Crillon, and the pavements in front and around the Hotel Crillon were guarded and controlled by U.S. Marines.

I remember coming in one night. There was an old bent French woman with a cane, and she was berating, and waving her stick at, one of these American Marines and trying to drive him away and crying out, "This is *my* home." This

was late at night and raining, and there wasn't a crowd around. But I suspect, if there had been a crowd around, she would have had a lot of sympathy. And that happened just a few weeks after the armistice. The American troops had barely stopped the fighting, with very heavy casualties, for liberating France. I always remembered the picture of that French woman, that rainy cold night, tackling this Marine with her little cane, which she had to prop herself up with.

Well, I think we have to realize this is a very, very difficult problem—a worldwide problem—and we have to find better ways than we have yet found to cope with it. It occurs almost everywhere. And it is particularly likely to occur in a country which has been, in the past, subject to extraterritorial privileges and which has resented them and has a strong feeling against them. It is not at all surprising that there should be manifestations of this sort.

I do not think they go to the fundamentals of our relationship in any way with the National Government of China, but they are incidents which are likely to occur. They are unfortunate. We have to take better steps to deal with them. And the facts in this particular case were such as, I think, tend to arouse extreme nationalist feeling.

Of course, we know the Chinese are given to that sort of thing. We have had antiforeign outbreaks in China for a long time. You remember the Boxer outbreaks of 50 or 60 years ago. I don't regard this as anything indicating anything particularly new. Rather, I regard it as indicating something that is very old—a sentiment which is deeply embedded in all people and particularly embedded in the Chinese people.

*Q. If I may pursue that question. You say you have been studying this for some time. Can you tell us whether there is any imminent overall administrative policy likely to be promulgated to deal with this situation?*

A. There is an overall administrative study which has been going on for a good many months to deal with this whole problem of our so-called overseas bases and forces abroad. I expect some report will be made from that study within the next few months, and probably decisions will then be taken on the basis of it.

*Q. In that connection, Mr. Secretary, the Philippine bases negotiations have been stalled on*

*the very same point. Will this be pertinent to that negotiation?*

A. This study?

*Q. Yes.*

A. Well, the study is not primarily directed to the status-of-forces agreements as such. The study will bear upon the question as to the extent to which we really need as much territory, or area, as we now use for bases—whether we actually need as many troops as we have there—whether there are not excesses which can be pared down without in any way injuring, and perhaps in the process increasing, the defensive value of those bases for the free world.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, when you were talking about the Girard case, you said that the decision on jurisdiction was reached last March to turn the man over to the Japanese authorities. Is it correct to interpret your remarks this morning as saying the high-level study that is going on now on the Girard case specifically is not concerned with who should have jurisdiction but with the political aspects of the case? I am not clear on that.*

A. We are studying all aspects of the case. I merely pointed out the fact that last March there was through the normal processes a decision reached that the United States waived jurisdiction and the Japanese authorities were notified accordingly.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is it our intention to provide any aid to Syria in view of Jordan's charges that Syria and the Communists are plotting to destroy Jordan?*

A. As far as I recall, we have not had in mind recently and do not now have any program for aid to Syria.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in regard to the Formosa rioting, some reports have said that the code room in the Embassy was broken into by persons equipped with certain types of hacksaws and what not, which would hardly be spontaneously found in the streets. Do reports indicate that to be true, and was there a serious compromise of American codes, as has been reported?*

A. Our reports indicate that is not the case, and I just had a report this morning that there had been no compromising of our code facilities.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, now that comparative calm seems to prevail in the Middle East, could you give us your own personal estimate of the chances for a more permanent solution of the Suez Canal issue or the Israeli-Arab conflict?*

A. It is extremely difficult to make any quick appraisal of those chances. There are so many factors which interlace, and you start to go down one path and then you see something cuts across it and you go along that way, and then you see something else. I wouldn't want to hazard a guess. I would say this: There are some slight indications, I think, that the time may be approaching when some of these basic problems can be dealt with without some of the intense emotionalism which has prevented any progress in the past. But you will see, if you think back to what I said, it is a highly qualified statement, in which I think I said "slight" and "maybe."

#### **Trade With Communist China**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you give us an estimate of what is happening in Paris on the trade question with Communist China? I understand the negotiators there have reached an impasse.*

A. Well, I am afraid you may be right, and I believe a statement will be made probably tomorrow about it.<sup>3</sup> But in accordance with what I understand to be the practice of asking countries not to make unilateral statements while the meetings are still going on, I think I will have to ask you to wait until you get that statement, which I think will be forthcoming tomorrow on that matter.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, will this statement be coming from the Department here or Paris?*

A. I think from the Department here. There is a draft statement being worked on here. But I think we are not supposed to give it out until tomorrow.

#### **First-Stage Disarmament Agreement**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to go back to the question of disarmament because I am not clear about the relation of the United States policy and views expressed by Chancellor Adenauer. Let me put it this way: Does present U.S. pol-*

*icy ascribe a top priority, or a first priority, to the idea of an inspection zone in the Arctic area rather than in Europe?*

A. We attach a top priority to getting a substantial inspection zone wherever we can get it quickly. Now, if we can get it quickly in relation to Europe, that is acceptable to us. If we can't get it quickly in relation to Europe but could get it quickly as regards some other area which is substantial enough so that it involves a real test of good faith and enables the significance and the requirements of aerial and ground inspection to be tested out, then we take that other area. In other words, we are not set upon any particular area. What we are set upon is trying to get something started quickly; and as far as we are concerned, we will take any area which is sufficiently free of political complications so that the whole process does not get bogged down.

I believe this is a situation where we should try to bring under control the thing which is controllable as rapidly as possible. The question as to what the area is should be determined, in my opinion, not by theoretical considerations but by the question, what is the substantial area where it is possible to get going with the greatest rapidity and with the least political complications?

As I indicated 2 weeks ago, before I had this exchange of views on this with Chancellor Adenauer, we foresaw, and it took no great vision to do so, there would be quite a lot of complications in finding a European area where you could get quickly started. There are all sorts of problems in Europe. There is the problem of unification of Germany; there is the problem of NATO strategy. You have got quite a number of countries involved in that area. So you have a multiplicity of parties. For all these reasons I foresaw, and indicated, it might not prove to be the case that the European area would be included in the first step.

That is not because we don't want to have it included in the first step. It is merely a question whether that can be done quickly enough to stem the tide and to give the people faith to believe that something can come out of the disarmament talks. I don't think you can go on talking and talking and talking for year after year and not get anywhere. I think there has got to be some

<sup>3</sup> See p. 967.



progress made in order to keep these talks alive. I think, if you make progress to some appreciable degree, that in itself would make it possible to make progress to a larger degree. That basically is the concept which Governor Stassen carried back with him.

As you know, he is in Paris today with his associates on the disarmament subcommittee—at least the Western powers associates—to discuss this whole problem at the Nato Council meeting.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of Chancellor Adenauer's views on this and your own statement about the political complications in Europe is it not now clear that Europe is not a place where you can get some kind of inspection zone quickly, and does that not limit our efforts to something like the Arctic Circle?*

A. Well, I don't want to be the one that pronounces anything like a death knell on including Europe in the initial stage. I think one has to take into account the views that the Chancellor expressed here yesterday, and undoubtedly other European countries will have views. They may want to exchange views with Chancellor Adenauer. Perhaps as a result of that exchange of views the situation will alter. I would not be the one—it would neither be appropriate nor timely for me—to say that the initial stage will not include Europe. I see lots of troubles in including Europe in the first stage. But if the Europeans can clear up those troubles so they can get started there, we are happier.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow that point, do you think it would be easier for Chancellor Adenauer to adapt his views a little closer to those of the United States after the September election in Germany? (Laughter)*

A. I wouldn't want to ascribe to the Chancellor any important political views as being motivated by political considerations.

#### Types of Inspection

*Q. Mr. Secretary, aren't there two things in inspection in this agreement, the aerial inspection and inspection for disarmament such as may be agreed upon?*

A. You have in the whole package several kinds of inspection. You have a certain amount of

what you might call fixed patrols, which go along with the aerial inspection. You may remember that at Geneva, when President Eisenhower made his proposal for an aerial inspection, the Soviets made a proposal for fixed ground patrols at key points. Later on the President indicated that he would be glad to accept that as part of the program, and to that extent the aerial inspection and your fixed ground patrols of important positions go along *pari passu*. Then you have the question of whether, if you agree that the future production of nuclear material shall not be used for weapons purposes—you have got the problem of establishing an adequate control and inspection system to check and verify that. Then you have the question of whether, if certain conventional weapons are taken away from the national forces and put into some internationally supervised warehouse or depot, you have to have some inspection on that. Then at some stage you may have to have roving inspection teams to go about a country to verify whether certain elements of the disarmament agreement have been carried out. You have a whole series of inspection possibilities. You have to have a communications system established also, because there is no use having people in an area—flying over an area—if, assuming they detect something significant, they have no method of getting the message quickly back. So there is a whole complicated system, a complex problem, and there is no one method alone which is sufficient.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, has not Chancellor Adenauer already said that he would accept aerial inspection over West Germany if it were not confined to West Germany? Did he express any such view to you?*

A. Well, I think that that is a question quite apart from whether or not the European area and the Federal Republic of Germany is included in a so-called first stage or subsequent stage.

*Q. He meant a subsequent stage rather than a first stage?*

A. I don't know. I am not familiar with the quotation you give me, and I wouldn't want to interpret it.

*Q. Is it your understanding that he does not favor aerial inspection over Germany in the first step? Is that correct?*



A. Well, I read and you read, I guess, what he said yesterday.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on another point here, at the news conference yesterday Chancellor Adenauer said flatly it was his understanding that the United States was not going to propose including Germany in a first-stage agreement. He said the United States had no such intention as far as he understood it. Is that accurate?*

A. It is quite accurate to say that the United States does not set itself up as the nation which has a right to propose or dispose with relation to other countries. Anything done with relation to Europe will only be done in accordance with the freely expressed will of the European countries concerned. We do not intend to put them in an awkward position by making proposals that involve them without their prior concurrence.

*Q. Was the proposal that we made, which you confirmed at your last press conference as an official American proposal for such a zone in Europe, including Germany, was that made without consultation with the Western European countries?*

A. I think I said that the United States did not exclude an initial zone in Europe if that was the willingness and desire of the European countries concerned. Certainly I never intended to suggest that the United States would lay down an official proposal which would involve other countries. I think we have always made it absolutely clear that we do not suggest anything affecting another country without its full cooperation. I am sure I also said that we would not want to propose anything which directly or indirectly impinged upon the reunification of Germany without the full concurrence of the Federal Republic.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of your estimate of the meeting with the Russians mentioned in yesterday's communique, that it would be in the very remote future, what was the point of mentioning it at all other than helping Mr. Adenauer at home?*

A. Now don't put words in my mouth. I did not say the "very remote future." I said it was not just around the corner or a matter to be dealt with, or what I thought would come to pass, within the next few weeks or even the next few months. I do not conceive how it is possible to get even a first stage, a rather limited agreement, through in

a matter of just a few weeks or anything short of several months. I did not want the impression to get around that I am about to be packing my bags to go to a conference of foreign ministers sometime this summer. I do not figure it is going to happen at that time.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have there been any administrative developments during the last few weeks since we talked with you about the question of admitting newsmen to Red China? (Laughter)*

A. I believe that there have been some suggestions come in from various quarters in the news world, the news community, which Mr. Berding is studying. But I have been pretty well occupied with some other matters.

*Q. There is no change in the policy? It still stands?*

A. The policy is the same.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, with regard to the Formosa thing again, you said it would not affect our policy toward Nationalist China or the Far East, but you did talk about a possible reduction of troops there. What about the investment of our foreign aid program there? Do you regard Taiwan as as good an investment as it was before? Will it continue to receive the same large share of our foreign aid expenditure as it has? Do you think it is justified in view of the demonstration that they can't even control their own mobs?*

A. Well, I have known mobs in the United States that couldn't be controlled, and we didn't stop all government expenditures on that account.

## **U.S. To Continue Total Embargo on Trade With Communist China**

Press release 328 dated May 30

The United Kingdom has decided that it can no longer agree to maintain a level of security controls over its exports to Communist China more severe than the multilateral controls applied to the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet-bloc countries in Europe.

The United States is most disappointed by this action. It means that an agreement for the continuation of a differential trade control toward Communist China has not been reached, even though many of the nations which have been en-

gaged in the recent talks on this subject expressed their support for such a program. For its part the United States contemplates no change in its policy of total embargo on trade with Communist China.

The recent discussions among the cooperating governments have revealed that there was a wish on the part of all countries to retain a unified approach on the question of trade controls on exports to Communist China. A majority of the countries, including the United States, sought a unanimous agreement on the maintenance of a differential. The United States believed that the security interests of the free world would be best promoted by the maintenance of a significant differential. After an initial difference of opinion on the precise extent of the differential, the United States agreed to a proposal developed by representatives of a number of the participating countries. This proposal obtained the support of a majority of the cooperating governments.<sup>1</sup>

The United Kingdom, however, supported by some countries, believed that there was no merit in applying a different level of controls to trade with Communist China as compared with the Soviet Union and that this differential should consequently be totally abolished. No one advocated any reduction in the existing security controls applying to exports to the Soviet-bloc countries in Europe, which controls would also continue to apply to Communist China.

The British policy announcement on China controls, while at variance with the position which the United States sought in the recent talks, makes clear the intention of the British Government to continue the application of security controls on strategic exports to Communist China on the same basis as is presently being applied to the Soviet-bloc countries of Europe.

## Israel Supports Purpose of U.S. Middle East Policy

### Department Announcement

Press release 307 dated May 21

The United States has noted the statement made by the Government of Israel on May 21, 1957, in which that Government expresses its support of

the purpose of the Middle East policy set forth by President Eisenhower and endorsed by joint resolution of the Congress of March 9, 1957.<sup>1</sup> The doctrine expressed in this resolution was discussed with the Government of Israel by Ambassador James P. Richards, Special Assistant to the President, during his recent visit to that country.<sup>2</sup> The United States shares and supports the principles and objectives outlined in Israel's statement relating to American policy under the doctrine.

### Israel Communiqué<sup>3</sup>

On May 2, 1957, Ambassador James P. Richards, special representative of the President of the United States, visited Israel to explain the principles and purposes of American policy for the Middle East as proposed by President Eisenhower and endorsed in a resolution adopted by both Houses of Congress of the United States. Owing to the shortness of the time available these discussions between the two Governments were concluded in Washington.

The Government of Israel welcomed the support of the United States for the preservation of the independence and the integrity of Middle Eastern states and for the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of their independence.

In the course of these conversations the Government of Israel reaffirmed its adherence to the following principles which, it is confident, also command the sympathy and support of the United States:

1. Israel reaffirms that in the conduct of its international relations it is guided by the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations to strengthen universal peace, to develop friendly relations among nations, to settle international disputes by peaceful means, and to achieve international cooperation in the economic, social and humanitarian spheres.

2. In conformity with its obligations under the Charter, it is opposed to aggression from any quarter against the territorial integrity and political independence of any country. It entertains no

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 25, 1957, p. 481.

<sup>2</sup> For Ambassador Richards' radio-TV report of his mission to the Middle East, see *ibid.*, May 27, 1957, p. 841.

<sup>3</sup> Made public by the Government of Israel at Jerusalem and at Washington on May 21.

aggressive intent against any other people or nation anywhere, and is agreed on the importance of preserving the political independence and the territorial integrity of the countries of the Middle East.

3. It recognizes that every effort must be made to achieve lasting peace both in the Middle East and throughout the world and will cooperate with the United States and other friendly governments to this end.

4. It recognizes that for the promotion of stability, well-being and peace in the Middle East it is vital to promote economic development dedicated to the strengthening of national independence.

5. The Government of Israel expresses its appreciation of the interest shown and assistance rendered over many years in the development of the State of Israel by the Government and the people of the United States.

## The American Doctrine and the Mutual Security Program

*Statement by James P. Richards  
Special Assistant to the President<sup>1</sup>*

I am very glad to appear before you to report on my mission to the Middle East and to answer any questions you may have in mind. I returned on May 8 from a 2 months' trip as a Special Representative of the President to explain the joint resolution of the Congress on the Middle East. This journey reinforced my ever-growing conviction of the importance to the national security of the United States of both economic and military assistance extended under the mutual security program. I would like to tell you about my trip and why it has further convinced me that we can ill afford to dispense with, or even drastically curtail, the benefits that have accrued to us from these programs.

In his message to the Congress on January 5,<sup>2</sup> the President stated that he was sending a mission to the Middle East to explain the proposals he then advanced. He asked me to take on the job. While the Congress was considering the joint resolution, I briefed myself on the problems which would be encountered. Thus I was able to depart promptly after the passage on March 9 of the

resolution.<sup>3</sup> Accompanied by a small staff drawn from the Departments of State and Defense, International Cooperation Administration, and USIA, I traveled almost 30,000 miles, visiting 15 countries.

### A Fourfold Task

The President had entrusted me with a fourfold task:

1. To explain the spirit and purposes of the joint resolution of the Congress on the Middle East;

2. To determine which countries wished to participate;

3. To make commitments for programs of economic and military assistance, within the provisions of the joint resolution and within the limitation of funds appropriated by the Congress, which I deemed to be essential and urgent to accomplish the purposes of the program; and

4. To report to the President my findings and make appropriate recommendations.

Regarding task number one, I explained in detail the President's Middle East proposals, as endorsed by the joint resolution of the Congress,

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 27 (press release 316). For Ambassador Richards' radio and television address made on his return from his mission, see BULLETIN of May 27, 1957, p. 841.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1957, p. 83.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 25, 1957, p. 480.

to the top government leaders in the 15 countries we visited—Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen. I was careful to bring out the significance of this American Doctrine as symbolic of United States recognition of the need to play a more active role in the Middle East, but only at the request of area countries. I believe the enunciation, by the executive and legislative branches of the Government acting together, of a completely American policy was profoundly impressive to peoples of the area. The different heads of state invariably had many questions about the doctrine and wanted particularly reassurance that the United States was not out to impose anything or exact any political conditions derogating from national sovereignty. I believe I was able to convince my questioners that this was far from our intentions.

I did not visit three of the countries in the Middle East. In Jordan, King Hussein was proving by his actions that he understood thoroughly the meaning of international communism and was capable of moving decisively to protect his country's independence and territorial integrity. We have tried to help him by providing aid through normal channels. The second country, despite our inquiries, avoided making definite arrangements for a visit by my mission. From the third country we received a piece of paper which might have been construed as an invitation, but the attitude of the Government as shown in official statements and through the controlled press made it abundantly clear there was no desire for real discussions.

Regarding task number two, 12 of the countries I visited publicly declared their support of the purposes and objectives of the doctrine. Subsequently Israel also endorsed it.<sup>4</sup> Two countries with which we held discussions, Sudan and Yemen, thought it desirable not to take a public position at this time, but they did not reject the American concept. Naturally the degree to which different nations recognized the threat of international communism, or were willing to proclaim opposition publicly, varied. Some stood up shoulder to shoulder in open opposition to international communism. Others are doing quiet but nevertheless effective work in the same cause. One thing did not vary. That is the determina-

tion to maintain independence and to achieve economic and social progress. To this end United States help was welcomed.

Regarding task number three, in 9 countries I determined that it was essential and urgent to extend United States economic or military assistance in accord with the doctrine. Conditions were such that immediate action would clearly further the purposes of the joint resolution either by building up strength to assist in countering possible overt armed attack or by increasing economic strength and internal security against subversion. I authorized in principle approximately \$120 million in aid, always calling attention to the provisions of the joint resolution, including the requirement that appropriate congressional committees should be informed 15 days before the money was used. Slightly more than half of the money went for economic assistance. Most of this aid was in the form of grants, although I insisted on loans whenever feasible. The military aid granted was always in furtherance of established military plans. It consisted, for example, of additional hardware, expendable items such as ammunition or military construction. In the economic field our aid was directed at, for example, communications, transportation, education, and water development. I sought opportunities to encourage regional cooperation. To the Baghdad Pact I made available \$12,570,000 toward projects approved by its Economic Committee for improvement of the regional communications system, railroad connections, and a highway project. This aid is intended both for surveys and actual construction.

With respect to task number four—to report to the President—I met with him immediately after my return. Although my mission was not charged with seeking solutions to intra-area problems, I found that the various countries visited held strong views on these matters. In accordance with requests from different governments, I have conveyed their views to the President. The importance of this American Doctrine with respect to intra-area problems is that, by turning back international communism, the Communists' continuing efforts to inflame these quarrels will be frustrated and thus their solution facilitated. I can assure you that our Government is not neglecting intra-area problems. Most of the countries visited are involved in such difficulties, many

<sup>4</sup> See p. 968.

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of them most complex and of the utmost importance to the people concerned. They are working to find solutions, and the United States, quietly and through normal channels including the United Nations, is doing what it can to help.

### Impressions

On a trip like the one I have just completed, one comes back with a mass of impressions. I would like to call your attention to six that stand out most clearly:

1. *The intensity of the aspirations of the peoples of the Middle East for economic and social progress.* They are determined to improve their lot. They recognize the limitations of their own resources. They are therefore determined to get outside help. The Communists are blandly offering aid on deceptively generous terms. We know from experience the trap behind such offers, but it is not so evident to people in the area desperate for help. Entirely apart from any humanitarian motivations, a hard-boiled desire for self-preservation demands that we not leave these nations with no choice but to become ensnarled with the Communists. We should not be deluded by distance into thinking the fate of each country of the Middle East does not concern us. Once ensconced, communism spreads like the plague. The effects of the closure of the Suez Canal is a recent reminder of the area's importance to our welfare.

2. *The value attached to old or newly won independence.* To the peoples of the Middle East their independence is either a sacred tradition or a new precious right they are just learning to exercise. In either case they are determined to preserve it from infringement by any source. Sensitivity on this score is an overriding obsession. Their receptivity to this American Doctrine rests upon our success in convincing them that the United States will act only at their request and then only to help them help themselves. The return to the United States from the aid extended under the doctrine, or otherwise, flows from what it enables the recipient countries to do for themselves. Constructive results would be negligible were political conditions attached. Fortunately the mutuality of interests between ourselves and area countries and the clear evidence of the value to each of cooperation lead us naturally along the same path.

3. *Attitude toward international communism.* Communism is anathema in the Middle East from the point of view of religion and traditional social values. None of the countries wish to see that atheistic creed established on their soil. But some nations have a tendency to think they can flirt with international communism, using it for their own purposes while keeping free of its tentacles. Their willingness to take risks in this regard increases in proportion to their inability to find a helping hand elsewhere and also, in certain cases, to see the possibility of what they consider just solutions to intra-area problems.

4. *Attitude toward the United States.* I had not realized what a reservoir of good will we have in the Middle East. Government leaders do not hesitate to blame us for certain policies. Nevertheless, they have faith in our good intentions, respect for our motives, and are eager to test the two-way value of cooperation. We have a unique opportunity and a responsibility which we can neglect only at our own peril.

5. *Recent improvements in area conditions.* I believe the last months have seen significant improvement in the area situation. Perhaps it is best described as the opening of possibilities to press forward for permanent gains toward peace and stability. With like-minded people we have made a beginning. But there are no grounds for complacency lest we quickly slip back behind the starting line. The Middle East is not an area of political equilibrium, if it is possible to find such a situation anywhere in our present world. It is a case of either going up or down hill. We want to keep on climbing.

6. *The importance and complexities of our aid programs.* These aid activities of ours are often large-scale operations. In the Middle East they are carried on under the most difficult conditions by relatively small numbers of people who undoubtedly make mistakes but whose efforts in their entirety are a credit and a value to our country. But there is always room for improvement. It is the duty, indeed the obligation, of all concerned constantly to search for means of increasing their effectiveness. One lesson experience has taught is that economic aid is not something one can package neatly into 1-year bundles. There is need for continuity in drawing up and carrying out these programs and for flexibility. The changes proposed by the President, I believe, are an important improvement.



## Two Features of Doctrine

To sum up, there are two main features of this American Doctrine. The first is the deterrent effect provided by the declared determination of the United States to use at the discretion of the President its armed forces to provide assistance if requested against armed attack by a state controlled by international communism. We have made this intent abundantly clear to the U.S.S.R. and the states of the area. I am convinced the U.S.S.R. will not risk overt attack as long as we keep up our global defenses. This assurance has brought vast relief to countries of the area, especially to those on the borders of the Soviet bloc and especially to the responsible military men. This aspect of the American Doctrine has already achieved a notable success. The second is the extension of economic and military aid to build up strength to resist subversion and to help repel any attack by international communism. This cannot be a one-shot operation. The flexibility in extension of aid provided by the joint resolution has made an important contribution. However, the Communists are constantly boring away, searching for weak spots. We need to have available, on a continuing basis, the authority to act quickly. The doctrine as a whole can be judged a success only if we make good in all particulars. It will profit little the American people and the people of the Middle East if we make effective provision against overt attack but neglect to provide protection against subversion.

## Proposed Amendments to Mutual Security Act

In conclusion, may I make a few observations regarding the proposed basic amendments to the Mutual Security Act. You may recall that last fall I was directed by the Foreign Affairs Committee as its chairman to conduct a study of our foreign aid programs and to recommend to the Congress by January 1, 1957, ways and means for improvement. If you will consult the record, you will find that my report included recommendations for basic changes very much in line with

those now proposed by the President. My views on the subject have been confirmed by my recent studies in the Middle East. It is my judgment that:

1. The mutual security programs, including provision of both economic and military aid, are essential to the security of the United States.

2. Flexibility and the ability to act quickly are of primary importance. The special fund requested by the President, which in the Middle East will permit him in part to carry on the work started by the joint resolution, is indispensable to getting maximum results from the program as a whole.

3. Besides providing for special and emergency situations, we need to help meet the demand for a non-Communist way toward sound development. The development loan fund and the closely related technical cooperation program will permit us to do this most effectively.

4. We would be unwise indeed, in my opinion, to forgo the immediate and direct strengthening of our own defenses to be derived from the defense assistance program. In order that the American people can clearly understand that the defense assistance program is an essential part of our own worldwide national defense program, it should be included in the Defense Department budget along with our other national defense programs.

5. These programs should not be one-shot annual affairs. Authority to spend funds over more than 1 year is needed and will result in better utilization of available moneys.

I am convinced that, by carrying forward these mutual security programs in the manner recommended by the President in his message of May 21,<sup>5</sup> the American people will help themselves by helping others make their own full contribution to the common defense and economic advancement of the free nations.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, June 10, 1957, p. 920.

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## The Middle East—Fundamentals of American Policy

by William M. Rountree

*Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I should like to introduce the fundamentals of our policy in the Middle East by posing a series of questions. In these questions lie the keys to the background of the area, its problems, and our objectives and achievements. I am certain you, too, have asked:

Why is the Middle East important to us?

What problems do we face in this vital area?

What do we as Americans want in the Middle East?

How do we achieve what we want?

### The Importance of the Middle East

Let us turn to the first question—why is the Middle East important to us? Why should a distinguished group of citizens such as that here tonight be spending the better part of 3 days to study in detail the problems of an area 8,000 miles away?

The Middle East is a striking and significant area. If there is any corner of the world that can most accurately be called the crossroads of culture, of peoples, and of political trends, as well as from the geographical viewpoint, it is the Middle East. In this area are four of the world's greatest river systems with a wide variety in lands and climates. There are rich agricultural areas, and deserts which defy development, and two of the world's most important waterways—the Suez Canal and the Dardanelles. This area has 70 percent of the world's oil, and exploration each year adds to the inventory of

its minerals. It is the cradle of culture, sacred and secular, which forms part of the heritage of every one of us.

The term "the Middle East" embraces a large segment of the eastern Mediterranean area and of the western portions of Asia. I am not attempting to define this with precision tonight. Some of my comments may not relate primarily to the precise area being discussed at this meeting. In general, however, the policies and problems to which I refer will be concentrated in that portion of the area we have traditionally called the Near East.

In an era of interdependence, what happens in the Middle East is of special significance because nowhere today are interests more important to us and more vital to our friends and allies. Take as a single example the worldwide effects of the closing of the Suez Canal. In Europe industries and economies were threatened. In the Western Hemisphere oil shipments were dislocated. In the Far East people traditionally dependent upon the Middle East turned to other sources of supply. The economies of many Asian and African countries sustained severe strain. Throughout the world there was a serious search for alternatives.

We cannot speak of interdependence without mentioning the importance of independence. It is only the truly free and sovereign nation which can cooperate on a basis of mutual interest with other nations. The Middle East over the past 4 decades has seen the emergence out of isolation and turmoil of many new independent nations. We regard the minds and hearts of the peoples of these new nations as of great importance to us. Without their understanding and support the area would be lost to the free world, with

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the National Conference on the Middle East cosponsored by the Dallas World Affairs Council and *Newsweek* magazine at Dallas, Tex., on May 16 (press release 292).

political, economic, and strategic consequences of the greatest import.

It is, I think, significant that in many of the great cities of the Middle East today the city walls existed well into the 20th century. Only recently have these come down and the narrow, twisted alleys have been bisected by modern streets. Similarly, the outlook of the people has broadened; there has been contact with new ideas and new horizons. There has been a tendency to reject the past and those associated with the past. There has been a suspicion of what outsiders said about other outsiders. The people have wanted to test their new relationships on their own terms.

### **The Problems We Face**

This area—impatient, emotional, sensitive—has, not unnaturally, problems arising from its present ferment. These problems are of concern to us because they affect seriously the stability of the area and our relationship with it. The fundamentals of our policy must be adequate to meet these problems.

What are the problems we face?

There is one general problem. The new nations of the area are imbued with a strong sense of their nationhood. This pride, this patriotism, goes correctly by the name "nationalism"—true nationalism, constructive nationalism. But in some cases extremist leaders have arisen who seek to exploit for their own ends this national feeling. Theirs is a negative nationalism, aimed solely at tearing down the past. Because the Western nations have been for so long present and influential in the area, this extreme nationalism often takes an anti-Western form. With a naive belief that nothing could be worse than the past, they turn to new relationships, sometimes with the Soviet East.

There are numerous specific problems. Many collateral problems and the widespread sense of insecurity arise from the frustration of serious, bitter disputes, often long unsolved. Today within the area of my primary interest there are seven major disputes between our friends. These give rise to a multitude of secondary problems. France seeks a solution to the Algerian question. The dispute over Cyprus involves Britain, Greece, and Turkey. The Suez Canal status is vital to many nations. The Arab-Israel tension clouds almost every issue in the Near East and gives rise to great bitterness. Britain's disputes with Saudi

Arabia over the Buraimi Oasis and with Yemen over the frontier present difficulties. The Kashmir dispute seriously hampers close relations between the great nations of India and Pakistan, which emerged from British India.

These problems—the negative nationalism, the disputes, and the attitudes of mind—would be serious handicaps to progress in any event. Today, however, they take on a more serious aspect because they become the raw material for Soviet exploitation.

The problems themselves give rise to chronic dissatisfaction and frustration, sometimes leading people to seek extremes. The resulting turmoil provides opportunity for the Communists to use people in a country for their own ends. Time and time again we have seen the familiar pattern. Greece was torn by a bloody civil war; Communist partisans were openly supplied by satellite countries to the north. The Communist Tudeh party in Iran infiltrated every branch of the Government and threatened the Government itself until the Shah took strong measures in defense of Iran's independence.

The Soviet Union has now entered the picture with arms aid and economic aid designed to increase the influence of international communism in other areas of the Middle East. The results have been particularly noticeable in Egypt and Syria. Local Communist parties have benefited from these Soviet moves, the motivation of which is clear.

We have no quick or easy solutions to these problems. The answers, in the last analysis, must come from the area itself. I cite some of them to demonstrate the situations we face in the pursuit of our own national interest. This interest—enlightened self-interest—must, of course, be at the base of any policy.

### **Four Fundamental Objectives**

What do we as Americans want in the Middle East?

In answer, we can list four fundamental objectives.

First, we believe in and hope for the creation of strong and independent nations which are able to resist the efforts of international communism to subvert the area.

Secondly, we believe in contributing, if requested by the nations of the area, to their secu-

ity. In a broad sense, their security is our security.

Thirdly, we wish to assist the countries of the area in resolving their disputes in accordance with the principles of the charter of the United Nations.

Fourthly, we wish to contribute to the progress and development of the nations of the Middle East.

We firmly believe that the fulfillment of the national interests of the United States will flow naturally from the pursuit and achievement of these objectives. There will be a developing relationship with the area and its peoples on a basis of understanding and mutual interest. Resources of the area will be available to the free world on conditions advantageous to both the producing and consuming countries. Transportation and communications facilities in this vital crossroads of the world will be available to us when these nations are secure in their relationships. Doors will be open to cultural exchange, to commercial intercourse, and to increased diplomatic cooperation.

In the achievement of these objectives, and in our relations with the nations of the Middle East, we attach the greatest importance to adherence to the principles of justice and impartiality. In the events of last October we demonstrated by the stand we took our firm intention in this regard. Two of our greatest allies were involved. We recognized that there were provocations, yet the President made it clear that he did not believe that a resort to force was the remedy for these wrongs. As he stated in a nationwide television address on October 31:<sup>2</sup>

There can be no peace without law. And there can be no law if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us and another for our friends.

The society of nations has been slow in developing means to apply this truth. But the passionate longing for peace on the part of all peoples of the earth compels us to speed our search for new and more effective instruments of justice. The peace we seek and need means much more than mere absence of war. It means the acceptance of law, and the fostering of justice, in all the world. To our principles guiding us in this quest we must stand fast. In so doing we can honor the hopes of all men for a world in which peace will truly and justly reign.

In the disputes that divide our friends in this

area, we can continue to command respect only by demonstrating our sincere interest in fair and just solutions for all parties involved—by acting according to principle. There are few black and white issues. In the resolution of the difficult problems we face, adherence to our stated principles, respect for sovereignty and international law, and impartiality must be fundamental to our approach.

#### Tools of U.S. Policy

Now for the question: How do we achieve what we want in the Middle East? We have listed our objectives. What are the means by which we reach them?

There are several fundamental tools of our policy: diplomacy, military assistance, economic and technical aid, information and cultural activities, and the efforts of our private citizens.

Diplomacy embraces the patient, everyday pursuit of our objectives through our embassies abroad and through the numerous international organizations and conferences in which we participate. It is through diplomacy that we present our views, attempt to correct misunderstandings, and negotiate the agreements and treaties which are the milestones of our foreign affairs. NATO and SEATO, for example, each with a member in the Middle East, stand out as results of the patient efforts of diplomacy. The peace treaties such as that with Japan which concluded the war have helped restore those conditions under which progress could continue.

The United States military today occupies a vital role in our Middle East policy. The military aid programs, for example, help to provide the kind of basic strength to the free nations of the Middle East which will contribute to their security. We have extended important assistance to the Northern Tier countries and to other friends in the area.

Our economic aid is another indispensable instrument in our policy. A nation must have internal strength to resist subversion. In Lebanon the United States has provided valuable assistance both to meet emergencies and to build for the future. In Turkey our economic aid has gone hand in hand with other efforts to bolster this important country. Our economic programs in India provide a firm basis for cooperation with this vital democracy and assist India to maintain

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1956, p. 743.



its own internal strength. These are but a few examples of our economic cooperation with the nations of the area.

An important part of our aid in the Middle East today is in technical assistance. Americans, many of them from Texas, have carried to other lands with great success the skills and techniques which have contributed to our economy. In some countries which have the money and resources for their own development only the skills are lacking. The technical assistance program provides them and provides a clear indication of American interest in development at the same time.

The undeveloped nature of many of the economies and resources of these nations has made it necessary for us to use governmental grant aid in many instances. As the economies develop, however, it is our intention to make greater use of loans as a form of economic assistance. Grant aid will continue to be needed in many areas, but the general proportion of loan to grant will rise.

To be fully successful, our programs must be understood. We can create this understanding in part through diplomacy. The peoples of the area today, however, are increasingly important in the making of policy and in the pressures which determine the direction of the country. We must reach them. In this the United States informational activities play a significant role. We face throughout the area active Communist efforts to distort and misrepresent what we say. Often news of speeches and statements by American officials reaches the area in brief form. If we can provide to the overseas United States Information Service texts of these statements, at the time of delivery or in advance, our information officers can take them to editors, explain their significance, and give our point of view. Our output must be regular and authoritative, using all forms of media.

Another important element in our foreign policy is the private American. It was really he who in many ways first carried American influence to the Middle East. Today the tremendously important contributions of our missionary and philanthropic movements are reflected on every hand in the area. Hospitals, schools, and universities stand as monuments of the contribution which has been made and is still being made by these institutions. I can cite particularly the American University of Beirut, where today the American

foundations and the peoples of the area cooperate in the perpetuation of a great center of American influence.

Our private interests have, in my estimation, two unique contributions to make in the area, apart from the provision of capital. They have the spirit of venture, and they have the skills required both for production and for the marketing of the resulting products. The world would be a much poorer place today without the results of the risks, the hardships, and the talents that went into the early oil exploration in the Middle East. These same opportunities exist today in the area. I hope that increasingly a climate will be created so that American industry and commerce can join the peoples of the Middle East to a progressively greater extent in developing that region for their benefit and for ours.

We cannot achieve our objectives in the Middle East alone. We have longstanding and close friends, particularly in Western Europe, who have important interests in this same area. We have, at times, differed with them but understand the reasons for the difference and have tried to move forward.

The United Nations represents another important and fundamental element in our policy in the Middle East. For 10 years the machinery created within the United Nations has watched over and mitigated friction between Israel and the Arab States. For 8 years, United Nations observers have tended the truce line in Kashmir. The United Nations provided the international forum through which the difficult issues of the Suez Canal problem were discussed. This world organization has a vital role, and we must support it and work with it.

These are the fundamentals of our policy in the area: our desire for strong and independent nations, for a peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with justice and international law, for security, for progress and development, and for a developing relationship with the area and its peoples. We work for these objectives through our own efforts, through cooperation with our allies, and through the United Nations.

#### Meeting Changing Situations

To implement these fundamentals we, from time to time, enunciate certain specific policies to meet specific situations. No one of these repre-

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sents the totality of our policy, but each contributes to the achievement of our broad objectives. Within the framework of our fundamental policies we must be prepared to meet new and changing situations.

In 1950 we joined with Britain and France in the Tripartite Declaration.<sup>3</sup> While recognizing the need of the Arab States and Israel to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and legitimate self-defense, it opposed an arms race. It declared the deep interest of the three governments in the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability and indicated that these governments would, consistent with their obligations as members of the United Nations, take action to maintain the frontiers and armistice lines of the area. It was pursuant to this policy and our obligations under the United Nations Charter that we acted as we did in the recent Egyptian crisis.

The United States has supported the Baghdad Pact from its inception. In November 1956 our support for collective security in the area was reiterated.<sup>4</sup> We said,

A threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the members (of the Baghdad Pact) would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.

During the past 6 months, the American Doctrine has become another significant element of our foreign policy. President Eisenhower's message to Congress on January 5<sup>5</sup> declared that the peace of the world and the security of the United States were endangered by the threat of international communism against the freedom and independence of the peoples in the general area of the Middle East. The doctrine was endorsed by a joint resolution of Congress which stated that the United States was prepared to use its armed forces at the discretion of the President to assist any nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism. The doctrine further provides for military and economic assistance to nations of the area seeking such assistance in order to preserve their independence and territorial integrity.<sup>6</sup>

You may now ask, "Are our policies achieving the objectives?"

I believe we can answer definitely in the affirmative. In doing so, we recognize fully that many problems remain—difficult problems which may take years to solve. The position of the United States and the West and the continued independence of the nations of the area continue to be seriously threatened by the Soviet Union and international communism. Despite the strenuous efforts of these forces, however, our standing and influence remain. There is, moreover, a growing understanding on the part of the peoples and governments of the area of the real dangers to their peace, security, and progress.

Our assistance programs have gained the respect and cooperation of the greater part of the nations of the area. I believe it is no exaggeration to state that we are contributing substantially to the economic awakening in the area, just as ideas from the United States have contributed to a political awakening. New ambitions and new hopes are being created. People once resigned themselves to their conditions, their fate. But now, in India, in Pakistan, in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey—to name but a few—there are impressive development programs which the United States contribution has, in varying degrees, helped to make successful. We can, of course, only help; for the most part it must be, and should be, up to the governments and peoples.

Ambassador James Richards has just returned from his trip through the Middle East to explain the American Doctrine.<sup>7</sup> In his journey of over 30,000 miles, Ambassador Richards visited 15 nations. Twelve of these publicly endorsed the principles or purposes of the doctrine. In those nations where there was no public endorsement the door remains open. Ambassador Richards found a growing awareness of the menace of international communism, a fierce determination on the part of these nations to protect their independence, and a deep reservoir of good will toward the United States.

You have followed, I am sure, the recent events in Jordan. We have stated our keen interest in the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Jordan, as we would for any nation so threatened. We have demonstrated

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, June 15, 1953, p. 834, footnote 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 10, 1956, p. 918.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1957, p. 83.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 25, 1957, p. 481.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, May 6, 1957, p. 724; May 13, 1957, p. 763; and May 27, 1957, p. 841.

that this is no idle gesture. We have responded to Jordan's request for aid.

I would not, however, wish to give an impression that I was overly optimistic. We cannot afford to be too sanguine. We continue to face extremely difficult problems which pose a great challenge to our policy. But we believe that our fundamentals are sound and our objectives are attainable. With continuing perseverance on our

part and with the support and interest of our people we can look forward with some hope to a time when the problems of this area are reduced and our relations with all of the countries are on a sound footing. We believe there is an identity of interest with the countries of the Middle East and that by working together we can each benefit and move toward a more peaceful and stable world.

## Berlin and Soviet Methods in Germany

by Eleanor Lansing Dulles

Special Assistant to the Director, Office of German Affairs<sup>1</sup>

In a period when the fate of the Nation depends on an understanding of Soviet intentions and capabilities it is important to study evidence of the nature of their policies and plans wherever such evidence is to be found. Many interesting signs of uncertainty of direction and fluctuating tactics are recorded in the history of their behavior in the last 10 years of their military occupation of East Germany and East Berlin.

Three things become clear in the course of such a review focused on Berlin and Germany. One is that the basic Soviet aim has been, and is, to force submission to Communist rule at almost any cost. The second is that the choice of Soviet methods changes as they blow hot and cold in their dealings in Europe. The third is that any evidence which might be interpreted to mean that the Western Allies, including the German Federal Republic, might weaken with regard to Berlin leads to prompt attempts to encroach on areas which have been held by the West at considerable cost. In contrast to this, the frequent demonstrations that the free world stands firm with West

Berlin and that the will to resist of the Berlin population cannot be broken have almost always led to a softer policy and reduction of threats and pressures.

While the German situation differs markedly from those where the Soviets exert pressure in the Near and Far East, it is significant for any study of Soviet intentions. In Berlin Soviet aggressive gestures and harassment of its people are worthy of consideration and indicate a basic insecurity with respect to their position in Europe and the future of Germany. This insecurity, in turn, results in no small measure from Russian realization of the German rejection of their dictatorship, their police system, and the determination of those both in East and West Germany to withstand alien pressures.

No one questions the importance the Soviets attach to their policy in Germany nor the fact that their attitude toward the city of Berlin is a key element in this policy. Thus, the Berlin story merits careful study and can throw light upon their actions elsewhere in Europe. In fact, the past and future events in this central point in Europe may well indicate the issues in negotiations which will demand the attention of leaders elsewhere in the free world.

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Women's National Republican Club at New York, N.Y., on May 22 (press release 311).

### Early Expectations and Plans

In November 1944, some months before the war was over, in three-power consultation agreements were reached by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Soviet Russia in regard to the administration and status of Berlin. Provision was made for a governing authority, the Kommandatura, on which the Soviets as well as the Western occupying powers would sit. These agreements were linked with the zonal divisions of Germany, which included France from 1945 on. They were based on the assumption that a way must be found to work in a constructive manner with the Soviets.

Only after the Communists took over Czechoslovakia in 1948 and after the indication of Soviet aggression westward were the full difficulties of the situation realized. At this time, encouraged by their success in Prague, the Soviets endeavored to force the Allies from the city of Berlin by their attempt to cut it off from Western Europe. It is clear that the early plans, while recognizing the extent of postwar devastation which the city would face, did not contemplate adding to the immense task of reconstruction the additional problems of limited access and continuing harassment. These material and psychological problems were compounded by the distance of the city from the area governed by the Federal Republic.

Since, in the period from 1945 to 1948, prior to the blockade by the Soviets, it was still possible to hope for a free economic interchange between Berlin and its normal hinterland and even between the East and West Zones of Germany, the questions of economic and political reconstruction loomed large. There was relatively little anxiety over the long-range attitude and aims of the Soviets since it was assumed that the passions aroused by the German invasion of Russia would die down and reasonable adjustments to the postwar requirements of Europe could be achieved.

It was in this atmosphere of war and early postwar occupation that the corridors of access—road, rail, water, and air—were agreed in a manner which seemed at first to be adequate. Thought was given to supplying the needs of the city and to assuring logistic support of the occupation forces of the three Western powers, whose headquarters were not, as in the case of the Soviets, in contiguous territory. It is noteworthy that

similar arrangements for Vienna proved satisfactory. Only with the Soviet blockade of Berlin in the spring of 1948 were the future difficulties brought into the foreground and faced by Berliners and the rest of the non-Communist world.

The brutal revelation of Soviet strategy in 1948 came as a shock to the whole civilized world. The death of Masaryk in Czechoslovakia became a symbol. The Berlin blockade brought a moment of fateful decision. The Soviet demands on the Germans and the forcible stoppage of surface travel and traffic to Berlin at this time constituted a major turning point in the relation of the entire Western World to the Soviet bloc. Moreover, the decision had to be made not only by the Western Allies but also by the Berliners and the free world concerned with the problem. The choice made by the Berlin authorities to resist the enticements of the Communists, particularly the offer of ample food and fuel, and the willingness of the people to assume voluntarily the risks of associating themselves with the three Western Allies were crucial to developing the strength of the German Federal Republic and the outlook for future Germany, its democratic orientation and its hope for unification of East and West.

The early years of the occupation of Berlin were thus compounded of surprise and disappointment, with a growing awareness of the serious dangers involved for the Western World in the Berlin position. Clearly, the Allied commitments made there could not be abandoned. The significance of our maintaining our position in Berlin for the entire satellite world and for the people in bondage behind the Iron Curtain was recognized when the three Western Allies issued the tripartite declaration of May 27, 1952,<sup>2</sup> with regard to the security and welfare of Berlin. In this declaration, repeated on several occasions, it was stated that an attack on Berlin from any quarter, or on the allied forces there, would be equivalent to an attack upon the three occupying Western powers. From this declaration there could be no retreat.

### General Soviet Attitude After the Blockade

From the end of the blockade in 1949 and the world-recognized success of the airlift, the fluctuating nature of Soviet behavior became the more

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of June 9, 1952, p. 897.

enigmatic. For a period of close to a decade the Soviets have maintained their separate position in the city. They have remained outside the allied Kommandatura which, although its practical importance is reduced for a reconstructed West Berlin, continues to meet now, as in 1946, to consider Berlin problems.

The Soviets, unable to win acceptance, have surrounded the city with large military formations and with continuing show of force. Their armed divisions maneuver, often in and near the city, in a threatening manner. They have developed a paper structure to support their political puppets in an artificial prominence which has become less than convincing in the face of the widespread German repugnance for their spurious authority. They have pursued a changing and unpredictable policy of harassment to individuals. They have subjected the city to various types of annoyances. These are often of tragic consequences to individuals but have had only a transitory and relatively ineffective influence on the political and economic recovery of the city as a whole.

None of these measures has been able to prevent the impressive growth of industry, nourished by American aid and by subsidies from the Federal Republic in Bonn. No Communist action has been able to dampen the spirits of the people, who, once they made the vital decision in 1948, have not wavered in their Western allegiance. The Soviets are constantly probing for opportunities to move westward, but they have found no faltering of the Allied support of the city and the political backing which has been afforded by NATO countries and by the free world generally.

The Soviet treatment of the city since 1949 has three main forms. There has been an attempt to intimidate by means of repeated threats, some explicit and some indirect. There have also been efforts to prevent recovery and disturb equanimity through various types of restrictions and interferences with travel and transport, and further there have been acts of terror and repressive measures against individuals which have kept blood pressures high but which have not basically altered the policy or the programs which either the city government or the Federal Republic has given to Berlin. These tactics have tended, to the extent that they have been influential, to intensify the support from the West. Efforts have

been made to detach Berlin from the West by fright and weariness, on the one hand, and to persuade the United States and Europe that the cost of holding Berlin was unduly high. Neither attempt has been fruitful, nor will either be in the future.

All of these Soviet tactics have varied from time to time. Pressure has increased at times of major Allied decisions. The main conclusion, resulting from an examination of these events, is that the Russians neither have been able to wear down the Berliners nor divide the Allies on the German question. They have rather revealed their own inability to advance world communism in this area and the near bankruptcy of their policy over the decade.

### Police Methods and Terrorism

The terrorist phase of Soviet behavior can perhaps be recalled with a brief reference to their frequent extreme tactics and the irregular and usually unexpected actions of their soldiers and of the People's Police under their control. A typical but particularly spectacular and tragic case is that of the kidnaping of Dr. Linse, which occurred in 1952.

Dr. Linse, a lawyer who was well known for his fight for human rights, was seized from the street in front of his house in broad daylight in the U.S. sector of Berlin. A group of 4 gangsters aided by 13 others in a carefully prepared plan supported by the Communist authorities executed the kidnaping. They seized a taxi, surrounded Dr. Linse, and forced him into it. They drove with their victim at high speed to the zonal border, where the official Communist guard, who had been told of the plot, raised the barrier so they did not have to slow down as they passed through. Before they crossed into the Soviet Zone, a shoe dropped from Linse's foot, still protruding from the half-closed door.

Numerous witnesses watched, powerless to prevent the abduction. Shots were fired by the gangsters, but the bystanders and West Berlin police were unarmed and could not resist. As the painstaking investigation progressed, some of the persons connected with the plot confessed and knowledge of this official effort to intimidate those working for human rights in the East Soviet-occupied areas became a symbol of the efforts of a free people to defy a police state.

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Dr. Linse may still be living. In any case, his name will never be forgotten. He represents thousands, many of whom may be less well known, languishing in prisons or executed for alleged acts of resistance to the Communist regime.

During one of the periods of most brutal repression at the time of the June 17th revolt an incident took place which will always be remembered. Without any evidence of complicity on his part, the Communists summarily executed a Berlin worker, Willi Goetling.

The latest case is that of Professor Harich, condemned to 10 years' imprisonment for diversionism even though a Communist. Professor Harich was a talented sociologist teaching at the University of East Berlin. At the time of the Hungarian revolt some of the students at this university expressed sympathy for students in various countries subject to oppression. Harich was alleged to have incited disloyalty to the Communist regime and to have endeavored to "reform" the party. His punishment was prompt and merciless. It was intended to deter those who ventured to question policy as those more seriously tending to revolt.

There have been other cases in such numbers as to bring terror to all those who played an outstanding role either in attempting to defend their fellows in Communist prisons or to help those who have been attacked by the Communist leaders as "Western tools" or "warmongers," or otherwise subject to threats of personal violence and death.

These episodes cannot be represented statistically, but in general it can be said that in recent times they have been less frequent. The continuing possibility of being kidnaped in this city, which is divided in theory but where barriers do not prevent easy access from one sector to another, has undoubtedly affected the personal behavior of many Berliners, making them more watchful in their movements, but has not altered either their political views or their performance of their daily tasks as politicians, as businessmen, or as teachers, ministers, or public officials.

From the fact that the Communists have not increased their activities along these lines and that there have been relatively few instances recently one is forced to conclude that they may themselves have come to doubt the effectiveness of such methods. While it is highly probable that they have given instructions to those in command of

the People's Police (Voros) and their military establishments to be tough and to create an atmosphere of alarm, it is unlikely that they have given specific orders to carry out any considerable number of kidnappings. Even the present line of policy, however, is sufficient to keep alive the bitterness of the West Germans and the Berliners toward the occupying forces from the East.

In their terrorist actions one sees another of those evidences of Russian insecurity and lack of constructive planning in their relation to the city and in their program with regard to the Federal Republic or even to the satellites in general. While there is a discernible effort to restrain resistance and silence objections behind the seizure of a few leading individuals who have been outstanding in the fight for freedom, recent cases of trouble have not taken this form but have been rather isolated acts of terror which would imply a degree of uncertainty in the high-level policy of the Communists with respect to Berlin.

#### Threats of Retaliation

A series of threats has been issued with respect to the city in particular, and German policy in general, on various occasions. Most of these have been directed in the first instance at the German people, trying to prevent their turning for support to the West—and only indirectly at Berlin. Some, however, have had more specific reference to the city. The general intent of this series of threats has been an endeavor to persuade Western Germany that its alliance with the Western free world would eliminate the possibility of reunification of Germany and the ultimate freedom of Berlin from its ring of oppression.

These threats have not been paralleled by promises of reunification on a basis of free elections. They have thus failed to intimidate and failed to persuade. It is not possible to make a clear link between these warnings from the Soviets and their occasional proposals on reunification.

In 1948 the development of Bizonia and Trizonia as phases of the Western efforts to move toward a free and sovereign Germany were both occasions of strong statements from Moscow. The setting up of the Federal Republic in 1949, the granting of sovereignty, and the linking of West Germany with NATO were similarly the occasions of strong statements calculated to force the Germans to turn from the West to the East.

One of the latest of these threats has been associated with the decision for the military buildup in West Germany. Once the decision was clear that Germany would be an important element in NATO and once there was practical clarification of the military program, there came simultaneously a surprisingly friendly tone into the letters of Bulganin to the Chancellor [Konrad Adenauer]. Meanwhile no restrictions of any broad consequence have affected the status of the city. In fact, production and trade from the city to the outside has increased 20 percent in the past year and has more than tripled within the last 4 years.

The Russians, in all probability, consider that their policy with respect to Berlin has been of little gain for them. They hold their line, it would appear, in the hope that at some future point they can challenge the Allies' position and use it if there was a weakening of support. As they see the Western sectors of the city in a stage of balanced and extremely vigorous expansion, and as they watch the cultural manifestations which come with a sound vitality, they must wonder both at the strength of this island in their Communist empire and at the inefficacy of the measures which they have used.

#### **Incidents of Harassment of the City**

It is interesting to note some of the past attempts by the Soviets to thwart Berlin's recovery. Many times pressure has been exerted and then relaxed because of the fundamental dilemma facing those who wished to persuade or compel but cannot risk a desperate uprising in the zone where they were entrenched. The necessity of making a choice between persuasion and terrorism in an attempt to compel people to do what they do not want to do, seen elsewhere as well, explains the fluctuating nature of the Soviet behavior in respect to the city. As long as its citizens have turned westward, Soviet policy has been designed to prevent restoration of normal conditions and to increase difficulties. I shall mention several illustrations of types of harassment which have been initiated and which have then been terminated or softened. The dates of change indicate the fitful nature of Soviet policy.

One type of harassment which caused serious concern in 1952 and 1953 was the trouble over the stamping of the permits required by the Com-

munist authorities for the shipment of goods out of Berlin. Our economic experts thought that interference with these exports of manufactured goods was an attempt to strangle the reviving economic life of the city. There has been no significant trouble of this kind since 1953, when the permits were taken care of promptly.

A few months later, in 1953, bumps to slow up traffic were placed in the roads in the East at border crossing points. At the same time the barriers at the zonal sector borders were increased in number and strength. At that time when these unusual steps were taken, the High Commissioner's office interpreted these annoyances as foreshadowing a probable split in the city. Events showed that this policy was not adopted, and in the last 2 years the bumps have been removed by the Communists.

In 1953-54, on the pretense of preparing the Rothensee shiplift, for a period of months one of the main barge canals was closed. Again the question was raised as to whether a "creeping blockade" was under way. This form of harassment did not continue into 1955, nor was it repeated. Only a reasonable period of closure, mainly because of weather, has taken place.

Another disturbing restriction to traffic occurred in 1955. At that time more than 100 barge permits expired. For a time the captains of the barges did not dare send their boats to Berlin for fear they would be seized or incur expensive delays. Various requests were made to prolong the permits or to allow the use of old permits. For a time the passage of barges ceased. The requests were renewed from time to time and suddenly, in December 1956, the whole package of 100 or more permits were validated for future transit in and out of Berlin. There has been no trouble with respect to the barges since 1956.

An even more serious threat to the economic life of the city was announced at the end of March 1955. The Communist authorities set a new scale of exorbitant Autobahn tolls on trucks going to and from Berlin. This, again, was characterized immediately by some observers by the phrase "creeping blockade," likely to assume serious proportions. After fruitless negotiations lasting some weeks the Federal Republic decided to pay the increased tolls. It was feared that, once these

payments were met by the Government, they would be raised again to higher levels. Fortunately this form of blackmail has not occurred and traffic has flowed normally. In fact, it is 30 percent higher than in early 1955.

The delays in clearing German trucks at check points have also seemed at times to suggest an intent to enforce a blockade on the city. These intermittent delays have been eliminated in each case after a brief period.

A review of experiences such as these and other aspects of the Communist pressure on Berlin does not appear to me to indicate a consistent plan on the part of the Soviets. The changing policy has not been clear in direction nor effective in preventing reconstruction. It has to some extent stimulated extraordinary efforts and occasioned many evidences of support of Berlin from outside. It is not clear that the city has suffered any substantial net disadvantage because of these occurrences. Traffic in and out over recent months has been dependable. There has been no significant threat either to the Allied position there or to the increasing Federal Republic concern with Berlin as a future capital.

In spite of the fact that the Soviets find Berlin a constant source of annoyance and an Allied instrument for thwarting their Western drive, it is clear that they cannot by these methods destroy the spirit and the vitality of the city. Even if they continue their frequent attempts to probe for Western weakness, there is no reason to think that they are willing to take substantial risks in the area. They have not, in fact, challenged the Allied rights with respect to the city or the Berliners' position since 1949.

#### Conclusion

The strange history of Berlin in the past decade gives a sound basis for the conclusion that nothing short of war can seriously disturb the morale of the city. A review of the sequence of events can be a source of encouragement to all other nations on the margins of freedom. It can show the positive effects not only of the will of the people to resist tyranny but also the importance in this situation of even symbolic military forces, such as are maintained in Berlin, at points of danger. Here we find a people who have been through periods of acute distress and have adjusted their lives to the

necessities of the times, a citizenry able, courageous, and adaptable. They are operating a municipality which can compare with those of many nations in Europe and can be expected to increase their resources and to improve their situation in the years that lie ahead.

One must realize that there is a deep weariness that comes with a long, continuous struggle. However, against this weariness there is the vigorous reaction to the provocative behavior of the Communist occupying authorities. The very irritations and dangers of their situation stimulate a vigorous response and give ample assurance that their efforts of a political nature will continue to have a vital meaning, and the momentum of their economic life is likely to build up until their standard of living approximates that of West Germany. Berlin has been a test case, within constricted geographic limits, of the failure of Soviet methods. This failure will continue, in Berlin and elsewhere, until the Soviets realize their error.

### United States Asks Departure of Hungarian Attaché

Press release 327 dated May 30

*Following is the text of a note delivered on May 29 to the Chargé d'Affaires of the Hungarian Legation, Tibor Zador.*

SIR: I have to inform you that the presence in the United States of First Lieutenant Karoly Meszaros, Assistant Military and Air Attaché at the Legation of the Hungarian People's Republic, is no longer agreeable to the United States Government.

Accordingly, it is requested that you inform your government of the desire of the United States Government that the departure of Lieutenant Meszaros from the United States be effected not later than June 3, 1957.

For the Secretary of State:

JACOB BEAM

*Deputy Assistant Secretary  
for European Affairs*

MR. TIBOR ZADOR

*Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the  
Hungarian People's Republic.*

## Committee for Hungarian Relief Submits Final Report

### WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release dated May 14

President Eisenhower on May 14 received the final report of the President's Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief.

The President approved the committee's request, following a meeting with committee members, that the committee be discharged on the basis that it had completed the work for which it had been appointed. The President thanked the members for their work, and the people of the United States for "the wonderful spirit of America in accepting and caring for these refugees."

The President also expressed his admiration and deep appreciation for the dedicated work of the many religious and other voluntary agencies which conducted the job of resettlement at such an unprecedented rate and in so many other ways helped the refugees. He likewise praised the accomplishments of the Government departments and agencies which performed vital functions in the program.

The President emphasized his agreement with the committee's statement that it was not dissolving because America's work for the Hungarians—here and abroad—is over. The policy of this country is to continue to meet its full share of the free world's responsibility and unique opportunity to help these people and to assist Austria, which with such great sacrifice cared for so many of them, the President pointed out.

The President approved and released the committee's report.

### REPORT BY PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE FOR HUNGARIAN REFUGEE RELIEF

#### I

On December 12, 1956, you appointed this Committee to assure full coordination of the efforts of all the voluntary agencies engaged in Hungarian refugee relief with each other and with the Government agencies involved. This work has now been done. This is the final report of that work and subject to your approval the Committee will now be dissolved.

We are not proposing that your Committee dissolve

because America's work for the Hungarian refugees—here or abroad—is over. The policy of this country is to continue to meet its full share of the free world's responsibility and unique opportunity to help these brave people who had revolted against the tyranny of Communism, as well as to assist Austria, which by making great sacrifices gave them asylum. This policy includes not only continuing to bring refugees to the United States, but also extending major assistance in other ways. Since, however, the requisite machinery is now in operation to provide this help on a normal, rather than an emergency basis, the continuance of this Committee is not necessary. One striking evidence of this change is the termination on May 9th of the humanitarian mission of the Joyce Kilmer Reception Center with the departure of the last refugees. It was possible to close Kilmer, not because no more refugees are coming, but because we are now organized to absorb almost directly into our society the remaining refugees to be brought here.

#### II

### The Transatlantic Lift

The magnitude of the exodus of Hungarians into Austria became clear by last December 1st, and your program to help meet the emergency there called for bringing 21,500 refugees to this country within a few weeks. On January 1st, you announced that this program would continue as the need continued. Up to May 1st a total of 32,075 reached our shores. Virtually all of these have been permanently resettled. So far as we know, no comparable mass movement into America has ever occurred in so short a time—of persons all penniless and few of whom could speak our language.

Substantially all of this movement was accomplished by a joint effort of the U.S. Military Air Transport Service (MATS), including both U.S. Air Force and Navy planes; of the U.S. Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) with its ocean transports; and of the Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). With complete safety, MATS transported 13,120 on 214 flights; MSTS 8,945 on 5 ocean voyages; and ICEM 9,664 on 133 flights. While Russian tanks were firing on Hungarians, U.S. military planes and ships were carrying many thousands of them to the safe haven of our free land. Like the Berlin airlift, the meaning of this operation was not lost on the peoples of the world.

#### III

### Reception and Resettlement

At the Joyce Kilmer Reception Center, ably operated by the U.S. Army, more than twenty voluntary and Government agencies served the refugees.

These agencies were completely independent of each other and reported to their own individual headquarters. Therefore, a co-ordinating office of the President's Committee was established at Kilmer and all of the agencies there readily accepted its organizational plan. The Kilmer operation became a unique team



formed of businessmen, soldiers, educators, Government civilian personnel and the representatives of many voluntary agencies and of organized labor.

Job skills of the refugees were ascertained, and an efficient system was set up to match skills with job offers. To standardize the operation of the Reception Center, and to assure that the experience gained at Kilmer would be readily available for any future contingency, the Committee prepared a comprehensive organization manual. By early January, the rate of resettlement had been increased several times over that prevailing only a month before.

The function of the Committee throughout was to assist these agencies, not to take over their work. It was the agencies themselves, Government and voluntary—many of the latter with religious affiliations—which did the job. Health and security investigations were pursued in detail by the Government departments responsible, relieving public concern on both of these grounds. Up to May 1st, only 5 out of more than 32,000 refugees have had to be deported as security risks.

Three major factors contributed to the success of this program of resettlement—first, the wonderful spirit of America in accepting and caring for these refugees; second, the dedicated work of the religious and other agencies which conducted the unprecedented job of resettlement; and, finally, the quality of the refugees themselves. More than half of the employable refugees were professional, skilled or semiskilled workers. Many were scientists and doctors; many more were university students. The average age of the refugees was less than 25 years.

#### IV

##### Assimilation

Supplementing the work of the initial resettlement, the Committee took a series of steps to assist in a satisfactory permanent assimilation of these refugees into our economy and society. This has proceeded well. Governors' committees to co-ordinate refugee relief exist in states which have received more than ninety percent of these refugees. Mayor's committees with similar responsibilities are active in various large cities. Resettlement work on the national level is now largely completed, and agencies exist in the states and localities to carry on from here.

#### V

##### Education

Over 1,000 university students were among the refugees. Among these, a large proportion were pursuing studies in areas of the sciences in which the United States has critical personnel shortages. With generous aid from several Foundations, the Committee helped in setting up courses in basic English and Americanization for these young people. We followed this with a program designed to provide scholarships and maintenance funds. Through action of the Committee an effective team to direct this work has been created, and will continue to serve during the coming months.

June 17, 1957

#### VI

##### Assistance Abroad

Last December and January the Committee also made an independent survey of the situation in Austria. This report proposed a policy and steps further to supplement United States action in giving refugees asylum in this country with increased efforts to assist on a major scale in supplying better temporary care in Austria and transportation to other countries which could give permanent asylum. The continuing leadership of the United States in this significant program directed by the State Department has, we believe, attracted far less attention than its magnitude and importance in contributing to the solution of the refugee problem deserve.

#### VII

##### Appreciation

So many organizations and individuals have contributed to this program it is impossible to list them all here. To each of those of whose work we know, we are separately expressing our appreciation and that of free men everywhere.

It has been an honor to serve under your leadership.

Respectfully submitted.

LEWIS W. DOUGLAS, *Honorary Chairman*,  
TRACY S. VOORHEES, *Chairman*,  
J. LAWTON COLLINS, *Vice Chairman and Director*,  
WILLIAM HALLAM TUCK, *Vice Chairman*,  
LEO C. BEEBE, *Vice Chairman (Kilmer)*,  
ALFRED M. GRUENTHER,  
LEWIS M. HOSKINS,  
MRS. JOHN C. HUGHES,  
JOHN A. KROUT,  
MOSES A. LEAVITT,  
GEORGE MEANY,  
MSGR. EDWARD E. SWANSTROM,  
CHARLES P. TAFT,  
R. NORRIS WILSON,  
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN, *Counsel*.

May 14, 1957

## U.S. Protests Travel Bans Imposed on Embassy Staff in U.S.S.R.

Press release 285 dated May 13

### Department Announcement

The American Embassy at Moscow on May 13 delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics a note protesting restrictions imposed by Soviet authorities on the travel of American Embassy personnel in areas officially open to travel by foreigners in the Soviet Union.

The note called upon the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs to inform the Embassy what steps the Ministry was prepared to take to bring the travel of American Embassy personnel in the U.S.S.R. into conformity with the Ministry's own notes of June and November 1953, as well as with the treatment of members of the Soviet Embassy traveling in the United States.<sup>1</sup> The note reiterated that, if the Soviet Union should conclude that the international situation were such that security requirements enabled it to liberalize its regulations restricting the travel of U.S. citizens in the Soviet Union, the U.S. Government would in turn be disposed to reconsider in the same spirit its own security requirements.

**Text of U.S. Embassy Note of May 13**

No. 914

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and refers to the Ministry's Notes No. 295/pr of June 22, 1953 and No. 400/pr of November 12, 1953 governing the travel of foreigners in the U.S.S.R. Reference is also made to the Note of January 3, 1955 of the Department of State, delivered to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., concerning travel in the United States by Soviet citizens other than Soviet citizen officers and employees of the Secretariat of the United Nations.

Experience has shown that there is a discrepancy between the application and enforcement upon members of this Embassy of travel regulations by the Soviet authorities and the application and enforcement of travel regulations upon members of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. From the manner and means by which travel of members of this Mission is regulated by the Soviet authorities, it is evident that the restrictions imposed in the Soviet Notes of June and November 1953 are being exceeded and in effect result in far more severe limitations upon travel of American personnel than indicated in these official communications of the Ministry. In this connection the United States Government desires to draw to the attention of the Soviet Government the following.

<sup>1</sup> For text of U.S. note of Jan. 3, 1955, outlining travel regulations for Soviet citizens in the United States, together with texts of the Soviet notes of June 22, 1953, and Nov. 12, 1953, see BULLETIN of Jan. 31, 1955, p. 193.

On more than 36 occasions since July 1, 1956, Embassy officers have been prevented from visiting areas of the U.S.S.R. open to travel by foreigners, according to the Ministry's notes of June and November 1953, by declaration of such areas as temporarily closed, by denial of travel facilities or by other means. In contrast, on only two occasions since July 1, 1956 have open areas, in accordance with the Department of State's note of January 3, 1955, been declared temporarily closed. Both of these occasions occurred subsequent to the inception of extraordinarily stringent restrictions on the travel of foreigners in the Soviet Union in March and April, 1957. The United States Government has never interposed obstacles to the free use of travel facilities by Soviet personnel in the United States.

When members of this Embassy have visited open Soviet cities in open areas, they have frequently been prevented by roadblocks and other forms of police action from moving freely about the city or to its environs when these environs are in open areas beyond the city limits. On the other hand, the personnel of the Soviet Embassy in Washington visiting open American cities in open areas are permitted freedom of movement within the city and are not prevented from touring nearby open areas.

Whereas members of the Embassy are often required to utilize a specific automobile route between cities in the Soviet Union and are not permitted to schedule travel over other routes even though in open areas, Soviet personnel in the United States have not on any occasion since the establishment of travel regulations by the United States Government been required to revise their proposed route when scheduling travel by automobile in open areas.

It is clear from the above that American members of the Moscow Embassy are frequently barred by Soviet administrative or other actions from free travel to those areas which have been officially announced as open to foreign travel in the Ministry's own Notes. Moreover, the effect of these actions has been to institute a discrepancy between the treatment accorded American Mission personnel desiring to travel in the U.S.S.R. and the treatment of Soviet Embassy personnel traveling in the United States.

In order that it may communicate to the United States Government the Ministry's views,

the Embassy requests to be informed what measures the Ministry is prepared to take to bring the travel of Embassy personnel in the U.S.S.R. into conformity with the Ministry's Notes of June and November 1953 as well as with the treatment of members of the Soviet Embassy traveling in the United States. In this connection, the Embassy wishes to refer once again to the note of the Department of State of January 3, 1955, which states that, if the Soviet Union should conclude that the international situation were such that security requirements enabled it to liberalize its regulations restricting the travel of United States citizens in the Soviet Union, the United States Government would in turn be disposed to reconsider in the same spirit its own security requirements.

#### INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Further Discussions on Suez Canal in Security Council

*Following are the texts of two statements made in the U.N. Security Council on May 21 by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. In his first statement Mr. Lodge spoke as U.S. Representative to the United Nations, in his second as President of the Security Council.*

#### FIRST STATEMENT BY MR. LODGE

U.S./U.N. press release 2675 dated May 22

In view of the importance of the Suez Canal to the economic activity of the world, it is understandable that France should have desired further discussions in the Security Council. In addition to France's interest as a canal user, it is true that her place here as a permanent member of the Security Council and her leading role in history in the advancement of civilization and in the struggle for human justice entitle her both to speak and to be heard with respect.

In my statement in the Security Council of

April 26,<sup>1</sup> I pointed out that "the Egyptian declaration in its present form does not fully meet the six requirements of the Security Council."

The principal shortcoming, in our view, is the lack of provision for an organized system of cooperation with the users of the canal. The lack of such a provision has cast serious doubt among the users regarding the system now put into effect by the Egyptian Government.

There are also a number of other ways in which the Egyptian declaration does not meet fully the six requirements which I shall enumerate as follows:

The Security Council has previously agreed that the operation of the canal should be insulated from the politics of any country. It is not clear from the Egyptian declaration how the Egyptian Government in fact intends to assure that this requirement will be implemented.

We note also that the manner of fixing tolls and charges, according to the Security Council resolution of 13 October, should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users. To meet this requirement fully, we believe it is necessary that provision be made to cover the manner in which continuous cooperation with the users will be assured.

We note also that the Egyptian Government has not yet deposited its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in accordance with its statement of intention to do so. Again at yesterday's meeting, the Representative of Egypt reiterated his Government's intention to take the steps necessary to accept the International Court's jurisdiction. The United States would be interested in knowing when these steps will in fact be taken by the Egyptian Government.

Moreover, further clarification regarding the manner in which Egypt is proposing to give effect to the arbitration provisions of its declaration would be helpful.

Finally, the question of compensation of claims to the Suez Canal Company is also a matter which requires further clarification. It would be helpful in this connection if the Egyptian Government could indicate more precisely than in its declaration the method it has in mind for reaching agreement on this important question.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of May 13, 1957, p. 775.

I referred at our last session also to the practical necessity that there be confidence among the users of the canal and that the arrangements be such that governments and private concerns can base their economic and business plans on the assumption that there will in fact be free and non-discriminatory use of the canal at all times by ships of all nations.

In expressing our willingness to give the system proposed by Egypt a trial I pointed out that the confidence of the users will depend on the manner in which the Egyptian declaration is carried out in practice.

As I said on April 26, the United States reserves its final judgment regarding the system proposed by the Egyptian Government in its declaration of April 24. De facto acquiescence by the United States must be provisional, and we reserve the right to express ourselves further on this matter in the future.

The United States believes it would serve the interests of Egypt, of its Arab neighbors, and of the users if the doubts that have been expressed could be dispelled by the Egyptian Government. In the meantime, we believe the Council should maintain its continued interest by remaining seized of this important question.

That concludes my statement as Representative of the United States.

## SECOND STATEMENT BY MR. LODGE

U.S./U.N. press release 2676 dated May 22

If no other member desires recognition, the present occupant of the chair would like to speak for a moment as President of the Security Council.

The Council has now completed a further discussion of the Suez Canal question. It is plain that a clear majority of the members of the Council are acutely aware of the responsibilities of the United Nations with regard to this matter. This is shown by the fact that the Council on October 13 adopted six requirements which should be met in any Suez Canal settlement—and adopted them unanimously.<sup>2</sup> There is the further fact that the Council has discussed this problem several times, and that it has remained seized of the issue is further evidence of the Council's interest and concern.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1956, p. 616.

It is, of course, clear that certain views have also been expressed to the effect that the Egyptian declaration and the present operation of the Suez Canal do adequately implement the six requirements of the Council. But the majority of the members are of the opinion that these requirements have not yet been met, that there are uncertainties that require clarification, and that even as expressed by the Egyptian Representative yesterday the Egyptian position remains to be completed.

It has been observed several times that the Egyptian Government has not yet deposited its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in accordance with its statement of intention to do so. It has been a month or more since the Egyptian Government made this intention known, and again at yesterday's meeting the Representative of Egypt reiterated his Government's intention to take the steps necessary to accept the International Court's jurisdiction. It is natural in these circumstances that members should wish to know when such steps will in fact be taken.

Questions have been raised about the nature of the obligations which the Egyptian Government recognizes under the declaration, the manner in which they were put forward, and whether the Egyptian Government considers that it can amend or withdraw them arbitrarily at its own will.

In this connection, reference has been made to the provisional nature of the Egyptian declaration. As the Philippine Representative well said: "Most of the members qualified their acquiescence as provisional rather than final." The Philippine Representative also said: "The United Nations must continue to seek a final solution, while giving the interim arrangements a chance to work out without injury to the interests of any of the nations involved."

Doubts have been expressed about the lack of provision for organized user cooperation in the declaration, and it has been pointed out that further clarification is needed on the participation of the users implicit in various paragraphs of it, particularly those relating to arbitration and the fixing of tolls.

Members have pointed out that the obligations which Egypt appears to have assumed require further initiative from Egypt if those obligations are to be carried out.



Questions on compensation of claims in connection with the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and concerning the method of reaching agreement have also been raised. Here again it has been pointed out that further initiative by Egypt is required.

Concern continues to prevail about the insulation of the canal from the politics of any nation, and this concern is inherent in all of the doubts expressed here about the adequacy of the Egyptian declaration.

These comments reflect continuing doubts, on the part of a number of members, regarding the Suez Canal system now put into effect by the Egyptian Government and about which clarification by Egypt is desired.

The Egyptian Government will presumably wish as soon as possible to examine these points carefully and to consider the concrete steps it can take to remove the doubts which have arisen. Member governments will undoubtedly be guided in their diplomatic action and users will be guided in their practical actions by the views that have been expressed here today and by the Egyptian response to the questions which have been raised here. In the meantime the Council will remain seized of the question and will be in a position to resume its deliberations to hear further from the Representative of Egypt or when other developments make it desirable.

## **Representative on Latin American Economic Commission**

The Senate on May 23 confirmed Harold M. Randall to be the representative of the United States of America to the seventh session of the Economic Commission for Latin America of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

## **U.S. Delegations to International Conferences**

### **Baghdad Pact Council and Military Committee**

The Department of State announced on May 29 (press release 321) that the U.S. observer delegation to the third Ministerial Council session of the Baghdad Pact, to be held at Karachi, Pakistan,

beginning June 3, will be led by Deputy Under Secretary of State Loy W. Henderson. Mr. Henderson also headed the observer delegation to the second Council session at Tehran in April 1956.

Although the United States has not adhered to the pact, it participates in the work of several of the major committees, notably the Economic and the Countersubversion Committees. Moreover, at the invitation of the members, the United States has maintained continuing political and military liaison with the organization and has demonstrated in many ways its support for achievement of the pact's objectives in meeting threats of international communism.

Other members of the U.S. observer delegation are:

Gen. Nathan F. Twining, *senior military adviser to the delegation*, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force  
Waldemar J. Gallman, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, U.S. Observer at sessions of the Council Deputies  
Arthur Z. Gardiner, *Chargé d'Affaires*, U.S. Embassy, Karachi  
John O. Bell, Director, U.S. Operations Mission in Pakistan  
Geoffrey W. Lewis, Political Affairs Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Karachi  
Stuart Rockwell, Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State  
Allan L. Swim, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy, Karachi  
George A. Mann, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy, Baghdad  
Robert C. F. Gordon, Second Secretary, U.S. Embassy, Baghdad  
Morris Dembo, Second Secretary, U.S. Embassy, Karachi

In March 1957 the United States indicated that it would be prepared to join the Military Committee of the organization upon invitation. The members of the pact have indicated their intention to extend such an invitation, and this action is one of the first items on the agenda of the Council session.

The United States will be represented at the meeting of the Military Committee at Karachi on June 3 by General Twining as Senior U.S. Military Representative. Other members of the U.S. delegation to the Military Committee meeting will be:

Rear Adm. Charles K. Bergin, U.S. Navy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
Brig. Gen. Orrin L. Grover, U.S. Air Force, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Brig. Gen. Forrest Caraway, U.S. Army, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Col. Stuart M. Alley, U.S. Army, Senior U.S. Military Officer, Baghdad Pact Military Liaison Group, Baghdad

#### U.N. Refugee Fund

The Department of State announced on May 29 (press release 322) the members of the U.S. delegations to meetings of the U.N. Refugee Fund (UNREF), to be held at Geneva, May 31-June 7, 1957.

John W. Hanes, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, will be the U.S. Representative to the 5th session of the UNREF Executive Committee, which will meet June 3-7. Robert S. McCollum, Deputy Administrator for Refugee Programs, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, will be the Alternate U.S. Representative. Their advisers will be David H. Popper, Deputy U.S. Representative for International Organizations at Geneva, and Henry F. Nichol, Conference Officer at Geneva.

Mr. Popper will be the U.S. Representative to the 5th session of the UNREF Standing Program Subcommittee, which will meet May 31-June 3. Mr. Nichol will serve as his adviser.

### TREATY INFORMATION

## Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.  
Done at New York October 26, 1956.<sup>1</sup>  
Ratification deposited: Afghanistan, May 31, 1957.

##### Fisheries

Protocol amending the international convention for the

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

northwest Atlantic fisheries of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089). Done at Washington June 25, 1956.<sup>1</sup>  
Ratification deposited: United States, May 22, 1957.

#### Weather

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization.  
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

Notification by France regarding Saar: From January 1, 1957, on, France no longer assumes responsibility regarding application of the convention to the Saar.<sup>1</sup>

#### Whaling

Protocol amending the international whaling convention of 1946 (TIAS 1849). Done at Washington November 19, 1956.<sup>1</sup>

Ratification deposited: Japan, May 24, 1957.

### BILATERAL

#### Australia

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 1956.

Entered into force: May 28, 1957 (date on which each Government received from the other written notification that it had complied with statutory and constitutional requirements).

#### Ecuador

Research reactor agreement concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 31, 1957. Enters into force on date on which each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements.

#### Germany

Agreement relating to the loan of certain naval vessels or small craft by the United States to the Federal Republic of Germany. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn April 30 and May 1, 1957. Entered into force May 1, 1957.

### DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

#### Designations

Francis J. Colligan as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, effective May 24.

<sup>1</sup> The Saar was incorporated into the Federal Republic of Germany on Jan. 1, 1957, by the terms of the Franco-German treaty of Oct. 27, 1956.

June 17, 1957

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## Press Releases: May 27—June 2

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No.	Date	Subject
316	5/27	Richards: Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
*317	5/27	Educational exchange.
*318	5/27	Langley nominated Ambassador to Pakistan.
*319	5/28	O'Connor sworn in.
*320	5/28	Amended program for Adenauer visit.
321	5/29	Delegation to Baghdad Pact Council (rewrite).
322	5/29	Delegation to U.N. Refugee Fund (rewrite).
323	5/29	Dulles: news conference.
†324	5/29	Statement regarding Gerald Murphy.
325	5/29	Herter: departure of Chancellor Adenauer.
*326	5/29	Becker nominated Legal Adviser.
327	5/30	Note to Hungary requesting departure of air attaché.
328	5/30	Statement on China trade controls.
†329	5/31	Delegation to UNESCO Executive Board (rewrite).
*330	5/31	Educational exchange.
†331	5/31	Delegation to ILO conference (rewrite).
†332	5/31	Atoms-for-peace agreement with Ecuador.
†333	5/31	Eleanor Dulles: "Education—Communist Style, American Style."
†334	5/31	Dillon: N.J. Advertising Club.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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